


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The CAVALRY JOURNAL

A Message
to the Cavalry
from
General
Pershing



**APRIL
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


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THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

VOL. XXIX

APRIL, 1920

No. 119

A Message to the Cavalry

FROM

GENERAL PERSHING

To the Officers and Men of the Cavalry:

THE CAVALRY of the French and British was vital to their armies at the opening of the war. The French cavalry, by its stubborn rear-guard fighting, aided the army commanders to regroup their forces and turn about to meet and defeat the enemy at the Marne. In the north, the British cavalry, screening the British armies, assisted their withdrawal. In the race to the sea, after Von Kluck had failed in his initial maneuver, again the cavalry played an important rôle by giving the corps commanders the necessary time to rush up the infantry to close the front.

Generally speaking, the character of the World War afforded little opportunity for the employment of cavalry as compared to the opportunities given to other arms. When one thinks of the World War today, it is usually in terms of trenches and devastated areas, over which was waged a bitter and tragic struggle, with the artillery and the infantry as the chief participants.

The contest became a war between entire nations, and all of the talent and genius of each was invoked to perfect implements that might turn the tide of victory. New mechanical appliances were invented and others already in use were developed to the highest degree. The use of gas, tanks, machine-guns, and aëroplanes and increased proportions of artillery and motor transport all marked the activities of the opposing forces to obtain the advantage. Lastly, as always, it was the infantry that assured the victory.

During this period all arms had a chance for development and

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employment except the Cavalry, so that to some unthinking persons the day of the cavalry seems to have passed. Nothing could be farther from the truth.

The splendid work of the cavalry in the few weeks of the war more than justified its existence and the expense of its upkeep in the years of peace preceding the war. The American theory for the employment of cavalry is correct, and Allied cavalry would have been of even greater use in the early months of the war, if it had been trained as American cavalry is trained.

In our training the necessity for mobility must be strongly emphasized. All our cavalymen should be trained alike and imbued with the same doctrines of tactics. It is essential that large cavalry commands be maneuvered in conjunction with the other arms, and teamwork with large units of the other arms developed. I have recommended to Congress that a Chief of Cavalry be appointed, and I hope that in the reorganization of the Army the cavalry will be no longer denied this office, which is needed for its proper development.

Due to lack of tonnage, we had little cavalry in France. Only a few regiments formed a part of the A. E. F., and they were necessarily engaged chiefly on remount duty. A squadron of the 2d Cavalry participated in the St. Mihiel attack with great credit. Once in the open, there were several occasions where cavalry would have been of great value to us in pursuit of the enemy northward toward the Meuse. In any future war on the American Continent, the use of cavalry will be as important as it has been in the past. It should be of due proportion to the other arms and be kept in a state of preparedness.

Individual cavalry officers gave every proof in this war of the highest military attainments and generally demonstrated that their professional knowledge was thorough in every respect. With their ripe experience, it is earnestly hoped that they will profit by the lessons of the war applicable to their arm, and that they will endeavor to keep up to its former standard the heretofore undiminished prestige of the cavalry.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, U. S. Army.

The Cavalry School and Its New Functions

Colonel GEORGE H. CAMERON, Cavalry
Commandant

(Major-General, Commander of 4th Division and 5th Corps, A. E. F.)

BY THE time the first number of the resuscitated CAVALRY JOURNAL makes its appearance, cavalry officers throughout the service will have become familiar with G. O. 112, W. D., 1919, on "Military Education in the Army," and with the recently published Special Regulations of the Cavalry School. However, a few words of explanation and comment may help to bring about the thorough understanding and sympathy between our regiments and our school without which the institution cannot hope for unqualified success.

Many of our older officers have doubtless remarked: "Well! Here we go again! Another course in Military Art at the Cavalry School. I remember in 1904 and 1907 when all of that sort of thing was thrown out."

Their memory is correct; but there was a reason then and there is a reason now.

General Sheridan's "School of Application for Cavalry and Light Artillery," organized in the days of two-company posts, in the nineties, was a long step forward, at that time, in that it assembled a large combined command for training and exercises. With the advent of the garrison school and after the creation of numerous large mixed garrisons, the Riley School had no special features.

When the 4th Cavalry came to Fort Riley from the Philippines, in 1901, Colonel C. C. Carr, as commandant of the school, became convinced that its tour of usefulness was about over. Through his efforts, supported by those of Major-General W. H. Carter, the character and scope of the course of instruction were completely changed. The adopted specialty was the horse. Equitation, horse training, hippology, care of animals, horseshoeing,

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etc., were taken up with a thoroughness never previously attempted in our Army.

It should be recalled that we were obliged to start from practically nothing. There was no plant, no accepted scheme of instruction, no qualified instructors, and no trained horses. The War Department called for manuals that the School Staff was by no means prepared to furnish, and last, but not least, there was strong opposition to overcome in our own branch. Instructors worked day and night. Realizing that the school must find and prove itself, they naturally desired as much of the students' time as possible in the development of the course to reach an unquestioned recognition in all matters pertaining to the horse, and they were consistently opposed to what they considered extraneous matter.

In 1904, when the late Colonel Arthur Wagner was present at fall maneuvers, the writer (then Secretary), hesitatingly broached the subject of ousting from the schedule of instruction "Security and Information" and "Organization and Tactics," on the ground that the subjects were taught in garrison schools and that the year at Fort Riley should be devoted to subjects that would probably not be as well taught elsewhere. In spite of the fact that he was the author of the text books in question, Colonel Wagner cheerfully concurred in the idea. The following year Topography also disappeared from the course.

In 1906-7, when General Godfrey was commandant, a short series of lectures and map maneuvers was introduced. It was not considered a success and was promptly dropped.

Meantime steady progress was being made toward systematic, intelligent instruction. Graduates were sent to Saumur who brought back the ideas and developments of the French Cavalry School. In the fall of 1910 a class of field officers were detailed for the first time and with the most beneficial results. Frank with their criticism and usually opposed to the so-called innovations of the school, they went back to their regiments converted, staunch advocates of our methods and friends who would back up our young graduates in their struggles as instructors in regimental classes.

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL AND ITS NEW FUNCTIONS

In 1913 the school may be considered as having arrived. Methods and details of instruction were firmly and definitely established and a hard-earned recognition had been conceded throughout the Army.

The school was not expanded at this time because under the then existing system (or, rather, lack of system) in professional education there was no demand for such change. Instruction, as a result of improved methods, had become more intensive, but time thus gained was utilized in carrying the student further. There are no limits to advanced knowledge and experience in the military profession.

Due to the restrictions of trench warfare, American cavalry was not called upon to play a conspicuous part in the World War, but graduates of the Mounted Service School* were in great demand at home and in France in connection with the Remount Service. Many of them filled responsible staff and general staff positions and others were selected to train and command the new regiments of cavalry formed in Texas.

In the past, young officers of both infantry and cavalry acquired knowledge of minor tactics solely as a result of individual initiative and study. Later, the studious youngster derived assistance and great benefit from the Leavenworth mailing list.

The garrison school, inaugurated to give preliminary professional instruction, was, unfortunately, a hit or miss proposition. Only too frequently the instructor was selected according to rank instead of attainments; with his finger following a page of the text book, he conducted spiritless "speck" recitations without examples, problems, or exercises of any description. To the ambitious such work was a farce and to the easy-going an imposition; this latter sentiment was increased by constant repetition due to change of station and lack of system. Occasionally a Leavenworth graduate conducted map maneuvers with some success.

There will be little controversy if we set the garrison school down as a failure. As evidence of the fact, one needs only to con-

* The designation "Mounted Service School" was adopted after a conference between General Bell, Chief of Staff, and General Godfrey, Commandant, in which the latter pointed out that it had the same significance as "School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery" and was much shorter.

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
sider the elementary character of the subject of topography maintained as a necessity in the course at the School of the Line. And the reason for the failure is not difficult to find. Lack of interest on the part of the commanding officer; occasionally, lack of knowledge.

As a general rule, line officers received no systematic tactical training unless they were fortunate enough to be detailed to Leavenworth. Two-thirds of them were not so fortunate. In the cavalry, a large number became absorbed in the specialties of the Cavalry School and devoted little or no attention to other professional advancement.

The deficiencies in our military educational system, quite fully appreciated five years ago, were emphasized during the recent war. Profiting by experience, a plan is now set forth in G. O. 112 that is not only rational, progressive, and far-reaching but that is also based on recognition of merit. Details to the more advanced schools and colleges will no longer be awarded by incomprehensible methods, but will fall to those who have distinguished themselves step by step. Under the new scheme, no cavalryman can reach the School of the Line until he has not only graduated at the Cavalry School but has shown marked ability here.

The only part of the system that appears somewhat weak is the unit school, in which "responsibility and initiative in development" rest on commanding officers. There still remain so many different kinds of commanding officers! If the "supervised delegation" means keen, close inspections by the department commander's staff and by the members of the Training Section of the General Staff, the unit school can be made to carry out its very important part in the general scheme. Otherwise we will have the apathy of our old garrison school and a consequent waning of interest at the most critical stage of an officer's career.

Undoubtedly the most interesting feature of our new system is the basic school. Here we have the youngster busily engaged, not in mastering the logistics of the division, but learning how to command a platoon of his own arm, how to instruct the enlisted men of that unit, and how to perform the various duties that usually befall a second lieutenant in the service. Another lottery



THE INSTRUCTORS



THE STUDENTS OF THE BASIC COURSE

THE CAVALRY SCHOOL AND ITS NEW FUNCTIONS

eradicated! When a youngster joined his troop in the past, he ran the chance of encountering one of three kinds of troop commanders: 1st, the firm but interested instructor who made him serve an apprenticeship in the orderly room, regular tours in charge of the mess, and who gave him the actual responsibility of his platoon at all times; 2d, the old-timer, who preferred "to do things himself and have them done right" and who absolutely failed to realize his duty to instruct his subaltern; and, 3d, the indifferent captain, who turned everything over to the first sergeant and put up with his lieutenants as necessary nuisances.

A trained subaltern can not be developed in nine months, to be sure, but some thirty odd troop commanders will each receive next summer from this school a second lieutenant who will be able to instruct and supervise non-commissioned officers in nearly all parts of our professional work. At present, he fully understands that he has much to learn and is eager to gain experience, but when he reports for duty he will himself know that he needs no old non-com for a cicerone, as did many West Point graduates years ago.

A glance at the Special Regulations of the school shows the very large number of subjects in which the basic school graduate will be grounded. The school staff is still in doubt concerning two or three subjects, as to whether they should not be more properly taught in the unit schools. Time will tell, and paragraph 4 of G. O. 112 encourages proposals leading to improvement.

As previously pointed out, instruction in the Mounted Service School became so standardized about six years ago that it was possible to attain desirable results in horsemanship in less time. By this is not meant in a shorter period, but rather in less hours per day. Consequently, when the program for the Cavalry School was determined there was no real difficulty in finding time for the added subjects. After careful consideration, it has been decided to begin the school year in the future on September 1st instead of October 1st. The additional month will permit the adoption of a schedule with a better balance of in and out of doors work.

The troop officers' class of this year contains several young officers who, due to various causes (continuous service on the bor-

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der, unusual conditions during the past two years, appointment from training camps, etc.) have had less than the customary schooling. In consequence, it has been necessary to make rather elementary beginnings. However, the visualized situation a few years hence is certainly appealing. When members of the present basic school return for the special course, instruction in all subjects will be resumed, not begun, and the possible advance in the tactical course, for instance, will be such that the School of the Line, in turn, will be able to plunge its entrants, without trepidation, into problems really appropriate to their length of service.

Some cavalymen may be skeptical about accepting the teachings of our new departments. In our early days, one of the best of regimental veterinarians wrote an article for the CAVALRY JOURNAL in which he protested against sending enlisted men to Riley to be trained as farriers and claimed that these men could be equally well instructed in their regiment. In answer, he was informed that the school made no pretension of having the only instructors, but that the question was not *could* the men be instructed in the regiment, but *would* they be instructed there and was there a plant available? The case now is identical; the plants of the new departments are materializing rapidly and the courses are shaping themselves most satisfactorily. It should go without saying that the competition of a large class is necessary for lasting instruction and that intensive work can be accomplished only when students have no other duties.

The aim of the Cavalry School, under its new organization, is not so much to develop specialists along any line, horsemanship, tactics, or arms, as it is to produce *balanced* cavalymen, *i. e.*, officers who can meet a tactical situation, handle their troops and machine guns properly, ride well, take good care of their animals in campaign, and see that the health of their men is safeguarded and that they are well fed.

The main purpose of this article is yet to be stated. Fort Riley is now the official cavalry training center. The Cavalry Equipment Board will be located here. Neither the School nor the Board can be really representative without free correspondence, frank suggestions, and open constructive criticism from our regi-

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ments. It is therefore proposed that each student of the troop officers' class shall be the liaison officer of his regiment; that he shall keep his regimental commander posted on the development of the school, and that he shall obtain the authoritative opinion of the officers of his regiment on any matter where a decision is needed for the War Department. Thus, after a conference of the staff and students, at which a full discussion has been encouraged, the pros and cons of any matter will be assembled and put forth in printed form. The student will sign and send this form to his colonel with such added remarks as may seem pertinent, and at a subsequent meeting he will be expected to announce, expound, and advocate the views of his regiment.

It is hoped that all cavalry officers will form the habit of corresponding with the regimental representative concerning equipment. In the past it has been a standing joke that it was impossible to find two cavalymen who would agree on saddles, bits or what not.

Let us get together. It is unreasonable to expect that we will all think alike, but, instead of indulging in heated arguments on the relative merits of devices, let officers send their views to the Secretary of the Equipment Board. A courteous reply is guaranteed. A suggestion may not be new; the Equipment Board may have previously reached an adverse opinion and made a recommendation based thereon. In such case the fact will be stated by the Secretary, who will also furnish the grounds that influenced the Board in rejection.

Similarly as regards subjects and methods of instruction. Suggestions from our regiments are earnestly requested.

In conclusion, it is a source of gratification to read in the latest views from France that: "the future of cavalry lies in its mobility." The school motto, "Mobilitate Vigemus," adopted in 1907, appears to be right up to the minute.

Review of Our Cavalry Situation

BY

Major Le ROY ELTINGE, Cavalry
(Brigadier General, Deputy Chief of Staff, A. E. F.)

THERE is little sound argument to be presented against a statement that the Cavalry of our Army emerged from the World War in poorer condition than any other arm of the service. As Cavalry we had practically no participation in the war; we had no chief to collect the cavalry data for co-ordination and draw from it sound conclusions as to the development of organization, armament, and tactics that the war proved necessary; and during the war we have lost rather than developed esprit de corps. We should frankly admit that unless we take drastic measures for improvement our Cavalry will soon die of dry rot, and we must act accordingly.

That our cavalry officers are able and competent is shown by their record of performance in the war as officers in all branches and departments of the Army, both at home and in the A. E. F. It is, then, in the system, and not in the personnel, that the greatest deficiencies exist. Let us enumerate some of these deficiencies:

1st. We are orphans. We have no one to look after, conscientiously and continuously, our training and general welfare; no one to propound a policy; no one to see that such a policy is carried out. Remedy: A competent Chief of Cavalry.

2d. We have no doctrine of tactics. Many elements are necessary to produce a remedy. Some of them are:

(a) Chief of Cavalry, whose office should collect all Cavalry data of the World War, study it, draw conclusions from it, and then, with the concurrence of the General Staff, enunciate a doctrine to the Cavalry and see that it is consistently taught.

(b) A Cavalry Tactical School. This school should give a thorough and efficient course in the details of cavalry

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tactical instruction for all units, from the platoon to the brigade, inclusive. The Cavalry School at Fort Riley is undertaking to do this, but it is greatly handicapped and will probably not accomplish the desired result this year. The tactical course at that school must be enlarged and perfected.

(c) Co-ordination of the cavalry doctrine with the tactics of all arms into a clear cavalry tactical doctrine for cavalry co-operation with all arms. The General Service Schools at Fort Leavenworth, under the supervision of the General Staff, will attend to this factor.

(d) Organized instruction in the tactical doctrine until every cavalry officer knows its elements, why it is a sound doctrine, and how the doctrine is to be employed for the size of unit he commands. This requires a training system, a set of inspectors from the office of the Chief of Cavalry who shall see that it is efficiently executed, and a suitable number of troops and adequate terrain for practice.

When an efficiency engineer starts to rehabilitate a run-down industrial concern, he promptly introduces "standard practice" reduced to "written instructions." That is exactly what we need in the Cavalry.

3d. We do not agree as to armament. With the 1st and 2d accomplished, armament can be agreed upon without difficulty. The next thing is to see that the Cavalry receives exactly the armament it is to use. The Chief of Cavalry must have inspectors attached to the office of the Chief of Ordnance, and at several arsenals and factories to see that no cavalry armament comes out without the concurrence of the Cavalry, and that it is of proper design and quality. Instruction for the care of armament should come from the Chief of Cavalry with the concurrence of the General Staff, and should be based upon care of different materials in the field—not their care when in storage. I think we can say that the question of rifle *versus* carbine is settled. Other questions of armament demanding prompt solution are machine guns (number and pattern), automatic rifles (number and pattern), accom-

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panying guns (number, design, and ammunition supply), and of course the ever-recurring question of saber, pistol, and bayonet.

4th. Horse equipment is in a most demoralized state. Remedy:

(a) Find out what we want and have enough observers in the manufacturing arsenals to see that we get it, both in design and quality.

(b) Learn how to take care of equipment and see that proper instruction is given in this regard. The Cavalry School at Fort Riley will give the necessary instruction. Inspectors—not the Inspector General's Department—should see that that knowledge is passed along to each cavalry officer, and that it is clearly and energetically applied.

5th. Great improvement can be made in the care and training of animals. Remedies similar to that in 4th; also, we require a properly developed remount system. Such a system must be developed and the people of the country educated to support it.

6th. We do not know what our signal equipment should be, nor how to use it if we had it. After learning what we can from the history of the World War and careful experiment with our own troops and conditions, the Chief of Cavalry and the General Staff could devise a suitable system of signal communications for the cavalry squadron, regiment, brigade, and division, and tell our officers how it should be employed.

7th. We have no system of Military Intelligence in the cavalry Division, where there is more reason for it than in any other unit of like importance. This must be worked out by the Chief of Cavalry, in consultation with officers of practical experience in field intelligence, together with the Intelligence Section of the General Staff, War Department. It is essential that it be done without delay. The work of G-2 is not the same with an infantry and with a cavalry division. The work of the Intelligence Service with a cavalry division is not well defined and must be carefully developed. Perhaps our observer with General Allenby in Palestine, who was a cavalry officer, is best qualified to direct this line

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of research for the Cavalry. Whoever does it should be a man with experience in *field* intelligence.

8th. We have an incomplete organization. In working out a proper organization, tactical doctrine, armament, equipment, and staff duties must be considered before a complete organization can be accomplished. Hence organization has been placed late on the list of our deficiencies.

9th. Our officers do not know how to employ efficiently cavalry in conjunction with the other arms. Officers must be given opportunity to know about the other arms and must be able occasionally to see and maneuver in conjunction with the artillery, air service, and tanks. Brigade cavalry stations should include units of these arms, and every opportunity should be taken to hold maneuvers in conjunction with large bodies of all arms, particularly infantry.

10th. We know too little about gas warfare. Cavalry divisions will probably not employ gas themselves, except smoke and incendiary, but they will need to know how to avoid gassed areas and how to protect themselves when the enemy employs gas.

11th. Our dismounted tactics are not suitable for employment against a modern enemy. However, the deficiencies above mentioned, if corrected, will require new drill regulations anyway, and this can be corrected at the same time.


12th. We oppose each other in Cavalry matters and mill around in a circle, with no one to make definite and final decisions.

Remedy: A competent authority to pass upon all propositions of armament, equipment, organization, and tactics, and to render a decision, final for the time being. For final decisions an authority must have prestige sufficient to cause its decisions to be accepted without further bickering. Such an authority would be the Chief of Cavalry, acting in conjunction with the General Staff.

To show up some of our present weaknesses, I will outline below a few examples of the principal cavalry activities and ask a few questions under each. The questions cannot be answered, because they are not concrete cases. Under existing circumstances,

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could you answer them if they were reduced to concrete cases, Where diagrams are used below, full lines indicate friendly troops, dotted lines enemy troops.




(a) The Commanding General, feeling confident of his ability to defeat the inferior enemy in his front, decides to send the bulk of his cavalry to cut the enemy off from his base, and thus capture his army (Allenby in Palestine). The cavalry is to move before the main infantry attack develops. The cavalry division commander wishes sufficient information of the enemy and the terrain to permit him to accomplish his mission and to supply his troops and care for prisoners during and after the action. Whom does he call upon for the desired information? How does the agent called upon get it, and through what agency? What means of communication with the army commander will he have during the movement? What with his artillery and brigade commanders?

The country is rugged and contains many excellent positions for the small hostile forces to delay the march of the cavalry column by machine-gun fire. Will rifle grenades be carried? If so,

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how? Will smoke ammunition be carried? If so, what kind and how much. Will he ask for light tanks to accompany his column? Armored cars?




(b) After a long and stubborn engagement, the army commander feels able to break through the enemy's center and moves a cavalry division to the rear of the place where the break through is anticipated, with a view to pushing the cavalry through the opening for the purpose of exploiting the success and creating confusion in the enemy's rear. What measure of concealment will be used while the cavalry is assembled in waiting? During the infantry attack, what measures will be taken to keep informed of the situation? To discover and mark routes for the advance? To prepare signal communications for use after the cavalry is through the opening? For prompt delivery of orders to subordinate commanders for the rapid advance through the opening?

The break through is made, but the enemy brings continuous artillery fire upon the whole area through which the cavalry advance must be made, and he may be expected to bring such fire upon the area beyond the opening. What formation will be used in marching forward? Will the advance into the enemy's area be by bounds, stopping for realignment and reorganization, or will the advance be continuous? What will be done with prisoners and captured material? How will touch be kept between division headquarters and subordinate units? Between the subordinate unit and units on its flank? Where will division headquarters be located? How will extra ammunition be brought forward? How will the troops be informed what areas have been gassed by

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our artillery and must therefore be avoided? Through what agency would the division commander obtain this information? How will the division commander know what point or areas are the best objectives for his attack? How would he get the information necessary to enable him to reach a decision on these points?



Having by today's engagement brought the enemy to a halt and tied him to his position, the army commander decides to use all of his infantry reserves in an enveloping attack tomorrow at daylight. He will envelop the hostile right flank, bringing the reserves into place behind the screening cavalry during the night. As commander of the cavalry division, how will you make the necessary arrangements with the commander of the enveloping attack? What plan do you recommend for employing your men to guide his units into place without noise and confusion? What plan do you recommend for the further use of the cavalry division? Can the commander of the enveloping attack set up his advance wireless stations and have them opened much before daylight? If not, why not. What arrangements must be made to get your men and horses together after the enveloping attack has passed your front line? How will you feed your men and horses tonight and tomorrow? How get a re-supply of ammunition? How water your horses? Can lights (hand, automobile, or other) be allowed during the night in the area controlled by your military police? How and through what agency will regulation of lights and road traffic be accomplished?

Many other kinds of problems, very complex in their nature, will come before the commander of a large cavalry force. How

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would such a commander, for example, go about any of the following with our present organization, armament and a staff if he were facing a modern enemy:

(a) Employing cavalry to pursue by a parallel route, the infantry following the enemy by the direct route. Would it make any difference if the enemy were poorly armed and organized?

(b) Cover a retreat which was slow and required him to fight a series of delaying actions. What would be his system for keeping informed about the enemy? For keeping constantly informed of location and situation of his own units?

(c) How would his units be instructed to go about the reduction of a series of machine-gun nests? Would he need any weapons not included in our cavalry armament?

(d) How would his troops act in the event of encountering hostile light tanks? Armored cars? Have his troops or officers been instructed in the tactics to be employed in such an event?

(e) What dismounted formation would be used for an attack against hostile infantry and machine guns? A hostile force of all arms? Does the Cavalry Drill Regulations give you any suitable formation?

(f) What formation would be adopted to cross an area when the area was under machine-gun fire? Artillery fire? Is there a difference? Do your officers know what formations are best? What formations and methods would be used for concealment from high-flying hostile airplanes when troops are caught in the open?

If the cavalry officer will consider any or all of the above examples and try to apply his ideas to concrete cases on the map, he will probably find some point of organization, armament, or drill training that is not suitable for the work he wants to do. The object of this article is merely to bring to the mind of the individual

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cavalry officer some of the deficiencies of our branch of the service and to urge that we all join in an effort to remedy them.

In general, our theory of cavalry employment has nothing to reject in favor of some foreign substitute. Foreign cavalry is learning what we learned in 1861-65. On the other hand, we have learned little since that time and forgotten some things that we then knew. Times have changed; so has the character of warfare. While the main principles of employment of cavalry as illustrated in the Civil War are correct, minor principles and details are totally changed by modern developments, but we have not developed accordingly. In combating a scattered and poorly organized enemy, our Cavalry is as good as any, and perhaps superior to any, in the world. There is no reason why we should not come abreast of the times for dealing with a modern and concentrated enemy. Not only must we know how to go about obtaining the necessary teamwork for larger units, but we must have practice in the application of theories to concrete cases. For such practice it is essential that we have a complete cavalry division at all times, and that it be located where there is opportunity for its maneuver. Then all officers and regiments should take turns in serving tours of duty with this division.

Let us get busy and accomplish this result, but let us avoid the other extreme of becoming a victim to each enthusiast's fad and fancy. We must build on the theory of becoming a part of the whole military machine, and to do this we must know how all the other parts function, and our relation to the functions of all the other parts. There can be no sense of aloofness, no attempt to work alone. We must work sympathetically and unitedly with all the other branches of the service and fit into our indispensable place in the whole united Army.

Mobility

By

Major GUY V. HENRY, Cavalry

(Brigadier-General, U. S. A., Commander 15th Division)

AMERICA'S PARTICIPATION in the World War has taken most cavalry officers away from their arm and has brought many new ones into it.

The war is over and cavalry officers are returning to their arm, confronted with the problem of reorganization and the training and absorption of the vast amount of new material coming in.

The older officers charged with this reorganization are asking themselves, "What has the World War taught about cavalry, and how are we to bring our organizations to a standard required of the arm as shown by that war?"

The war has demonstrated that the American theories for the training and use of cavalry are thoroughly sound. It has shown that cavalry, to be successful in modern war, must have heavy fire power and great mobility, the most essential of these two being the latter, for without this the arm cannot fulfill its rôle when the supreme test comes.

If mobility has been proved so important, the question that we should ask is, "Was our pre-war mobility satisfactory?"

If we are honest with ourselves in answering this question, we must admit that, with the exception of isolated regiments or troops in a regiment, our mobility was far below what it should have been—our horses lacked conditioning, our officers and men lacked the will and the desire to ride.

Such being the answer to our question, we must seek the reasons which produced these conditions if they are to be corrected. They are many and various; but if we eliminate our lack of mili-

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tary policy, undermanned organizations, and the indifferent remounts furnished our cavalry, the following resolve themselves, viz.:

- Poor conditioning of horses, together with our stable management, which cannot be classed above average.
- Indifferent shoeing.
- Ill-fitting horse equipment.
- Indifferent march discipline.
- Lack of attention to feeding and watering in the field.
- Badly timed commands.
- Poorly gaited organizations.
- Poor training of remounts.
- Lack of efficient instruction in equitation.
- Absence of both horses and men from mounted work.
- Lack of real interest on the part of officers and men in their horses.

Until the above conditions are rectified, we can never hope for a maximum mobility, no matter what our military policy or the class of remounts furnished us may be.

Many will contend that the above condition of affairs did or does not exist. With these I beg to differ and insist that they do exist in numbers of our cavalry commands.

Conditioning is dependent upon rational exercise, feeding regulated according to work done, and proper grooming. In how many of our cavalry organizations are drills and marches based on the condition of the horses and conducted with a view of gradually building up their muscles and expanding their lung power until they are put and held in the condition of a hard, well-developed, athletic man? In how many of our organizations is the feeding varied with the work in view or at hand, and the feeding further graded according to the needs of the individual horse? Thousands of pounds of forage are annually fed to overfat horses and to underworked horses, which is simply doing the horse harm and which will cause him to drop down when called on for hard work, while, on the other hand, if properly distributed would be either a saving to the Government or a reserve on which to draw in time of need.

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Indifferent shoeing is so frequent that most will admit it without comment.

In how many organizations is the equipment adjusted under the direct supervision of an officer and fitted so as to produce the maximum comfort in both man and horse?

Are rushing orderlies, horseplay, straggling, falling out, and slouching in the saddle completely eliminated during our marches? Do all organization commanders keep a qualified subordinate in rear of each column, who effectively eliminates the above abuses? Do group leaders inspect the shoeing and adjustment of equipment at each halt and during marches insist that accurate gaits and cadence be maintained?

In the field, do officers study ways and means and hours for feeding, so that every ounce of forage available will be consumed to advantage, none wasted and none trampled in mud or sand? Are all organizations so trained and supervised that each horse can quietly drink his fill?

Does each leader so give and time his commands that they are suitable to the gait, and give them so that they may be obeyed by every man and horse at the instant given?

Do these same leaders set correct and accurate gaits, and if such are set are the men and horses so instructed that they will keep them?

Are our remounts properly trained, and is our instruction in equitation efficient or sufficient? Great progress was made along these lines before the war, but there is still much to be desired.

Most of the commanding officers are very insistent that all men attend mounted work, but are they equally insistent that all horses do the same? If not, each unconditioned horse is a weak link in the chain of mobility when hard work is demanded.

Do our officers and men really take an interest in their horses, and do they really desire to ride them for pleasure and recreation? Is not the horse with many of these individuals an article to be put aside as soon as the prescribed day's mounted work is done?

Until each of our organizations can be classified as superior in everything which I have mentioned, we cannot lay claim to

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proper mobility or to such mobility as the other branches of the service can rightfully expect of us.

If what I have said is true, why should such a condition of affairs exist? As previously stated, there are many reasons, the principal ones being that officers do not receive any systematic education in these matters and simply grow up in the service, absorbing such information and ideas as may come their way. Regimental and squadron commanders do not sufficiently supervise their troop officers and insist that all practice such things as increase mobility and make the soldier comfortable when on the horse's back. These same commanding officers do not arouse enthusiasm in their officers and men to participate in various mounted sports and contests, and thus make them look to their horses for recreation rather than as simply tools for work.

What is the remedy for our future Army?

Educate our officers. Establish at the Cavalry School courses of instruction in every subject, proficiency in which will tend to increase mobility.

The War Department should bend its efforts in organizing and maintaining at the Cavalry School an especially selected regiment of school troops, which should in every way be a model cavalry regiment for the Army.

Send to the Cavalry School for the next few years the largest possible number of officers.

Establish a corps of competent visiting instructors, who will visit for short periods every cavalry organization in the Regular Army, National Guard, and R. O. T. C. units and instruct by lectures and demonstrations officers of these organizations in all that is being taught at the Cavalry School, or in any subject that will tend to standardize instruction and promote efficiency.

Arouse interest in mounted sports and contests. Until officers and men look upon their horses as something more than tools for work, they will never take that interest in them that is essential for the highest mounted efficiency. Nothing will promote interest in all which pertains to the horse as keen rivalry in mounted sports and mounted military contests. Officers will procure good horses for these, will learn to condition them, to train them, and

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to ride them. This enthusiasm will be passed on to the men who will spend their leisure hours in improving and training themselves and horses with the feeling that they are at play and with the resulting good that comes from enthusiastic voluntary work. The hours spent on a horse produce the rider ever eager for patrolling and whom long hard marches do not tire.

Appoint a Chief of Cavalry. Promptly appoint a Chief of Cavalry, or an Acting Chief pending legislation, who can establish standards for and who can co-ordinate and encourage all the subjects I have touched upon, together with the many others which are necessary for proficient cavalry—an officer who can be the leader, the careful mother, and the strict father of our arm; an officer who can surround himself with competent inspector-instructors, and who through them and by personal visits can continually keep himself in touch with every cavalry organization, so that there may be mutual understanding and an honest maximum efficiency demanded of all.

Only by the adoption of some such methods as suggested above will we improve on our pre-war general efficiency or will we arrive at a standard of mobility complimentary to ourselves, the only standard which the nation has a right to demand of its cavalry.

The Rout of the Turks by Allenby's Cavalry*

Palestine Campaign

By

Colonel GEORGE E. MITCHELL, General Staff Corps

THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

EGYPT was formerly a dependency of Turkey, but the British in recent years displaced Turkish authority and assumed supervision of Egyptian affairs. When Turkey entered the war it became necessary for the British to protect their Egyptian interests and also the Suez Canal against attacks from Turkey by way of Palestine. From the beginning of history, Palestine has been the route of invasion of Egypt from Asia Minor, and *vice versa*.

In 1915 the Turks had assembled in the vicinity of Beersheba for an attack on the Suez Canal and an invasion of Egypt. A force of 20,000 Turks was driven back from the canal, losing 1,000 or more prisoners and many guns. During this year the Germans and Turks constructed many military roads and railroads, preparatory to another attack in 1916. The attack in 1916, however, was also unsuccessful.

On the other hand, the British under General Sir Archibald Murray advanced from the Suez Canal to El Katia, El Arish, and in the spring of 1917 were at Wadi Ghuzze, near Gaza. Great difficulty was experienced in the supply of water and other necessities. In March and again in April the British attacked the Turkish position at Gaza without success, after which they withdrew to the Wadi Ghuzze. For six months thereafter the British were occupied in improving their lines of communication. Meanwhile General Sir Edmund Allenby had relieved General Murray in com-

* This article is based upon accounts of the Palestine Campaign in Nelson's History of the War, "The Times History of the War," and upon the account of Colonel Edward Davis, U. S. Cavalry.

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mand in June, 1917. The summer, however, was unfavorable to operations, as it was the dry season, and the scarcity of water was greater than ever. To overcome this difficulty a pipe line was built from Egypt to bring in water, and a light railway was next constructed, so as to accumulate supplies for use during the operations which were contemplated for the fall of the year. Later on this light railway was extended along the Wadi Ghuzze to Karm and toward El Bugar.

The country through which the British had advanced from Suez to the Turkish position is sandy and dry. To the south and east of Beersheba it is little more than a wilderness, but to the north and northwest the land is cultivated during the spring, producing grain and fruit. Beersheba itself lies in a valley, called Wadi-el-Khalil, extending south from Hebron. At Beersheba this valley turns westward, under the name of Wadi-es-Saba, and still farther west it is called Wadi Ghuzze. About three miles east of Beersheba is a lofty hill, called Tel-es-Saba, which was the site of ancient Sheba.

The main Turkish position extended from Beersheba northwest to Gaza. Beersheba was established by the Turks a few years before the war as a frontier military post, and after the entry of Turkey into the war it became the depot for the forces operating against Egypt. It was strongly fortified. An excellent road was constructed along the Palestine watershed from Beersheba to Hebron and Jerusalem. A newly constructed railroad connects Beersheba to Jerusalem and Damascus and extends south of Beersheba to El Auja. North of Beersheba the country is hilly, and as one approaches Bethlehem the country becomes mountainous and difficult.

Gaza, at the other end of the Turkish position, was on a fortified hill about three miles from the sea. A good road connects Gaza with Er Ramleh, on the main road between Jaffa and Jerusalem, and a railroad recently constructed extended from Deir Sined (Beit Hanun), five miles north of Gaza, to El Tineh, a station on the Beersheba-Jerusalem Railroad.

The remainder of the Turkish line followed a road on the high ground north of the Wadi Ghuzze, with strong points at intervals

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of about five miles. These strong points in general occupied ridges commanding the ravines branching off from Wadi Ghuzze. The strongest of these positions were Atawineh Ridge; Hereira and Rushdi in the center, and Abu Irgeig nearer Beersheba.

The country along the seacoast consists of sand dunes for an average distance of three miles inland. The country then becomes higher and more fertile, till it culminates in the mountains lying between the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean. This land between the sea and the mountains is called the Philistine Plain. The plain is broken in general by valleys, or wadis, extending from the mountains to the Mediterranean Sea. They are dry except in the rainy season. Near their mouths these wadis have steep banks and are in reality small ravines. The principal valleys, as one goes north from Gaza by the sea road, are first Wadi-el-Hesy, 10 miles north of Gaza; second, Nahr, 22 miles north; third, Wadi Surar, 32 miles north; fourth, the historic vale of Ajalon (Nahr Alija), leading to Jerusalem from Jaffa.

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

By the fall of 1917 the British had successfully defended the Suez Canal, but had not gained decisive results. Falkenhayn had assumed charge of Turkish operations, with orders to regain the territory which had been lost to the Turks. The British could not stand fast and await the Turkish attack. They had to advance. In Jerusalem they had a tangible objective. Its capture would have a depressing effect on Turkish morale and would be felt in the Mohammedan world. An attack by the British on the Turkish position was necessary.

A frontal attack was not likely to succeed, because the Turkish position had been strengthened since spring with men, guns, and by works constructed between the two flank fortresses of Gaza and Beersheba. Although the Turkish position was apparently a fortified line, there were gaps in this line, of which the most notable was that between Hereira and Beersheba. This gap was so great (about 15 miles) that Beersheba was virtually a detached fort.

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If the enemy position was to be turned, the eastern end offered the greater prospect of success. It required the prompt capture of Beersheba at the beginning of the campaign, then an attack on the Hereira-Tel-esh Sheriah line, and a further attack against Gaza from the east, along and behind the ridge extending from Gaza toward Hereira. To make the attack on Beersheba a success, it had to be sudden and its capture must be accomplished before reinforcements could reach the place.

This plan of attacking the left of the Turkish line had been considered by General Murray in March, but had been rejected because of the difficulty of supply. These difficulties had been reduced by the extension of the British railway to Karm and by the improvements in the lines of communications extending from Egypt. There was good water at Beersheba, Hereira, and at Sheriah, but nowhere else in the immediate vicinity. Motor and wheel transport were unsuitable for the country south of the Gaza-Beersheba line and camels would have to be used.

The country around Beersheba is cut by numerous deep water-courses, of which the Wadi Sabi is the most notable. In the angle between the Wadi Saba and the railroad to El Auja lies Hill 1070. This hill was well fortified and commanded the town and the country southwest of Beersheba.

THE CAMPAIGN

In order to draw the Turks' attention away from Beersheba, a heavy bombardment of the Gaza fortifications was begun on October 27th, while the British were moving their troops to the east preparatory to their attack on Beersheba. The British took precautions to conceal this movement by marching at night. On the 30th the bombardment of Gaza was assisted by the fleet in the Mediterranean. On the night of October 30-31, the troops for the attack of Beersheba started in the moonlight for their attack positions. The attack was begun at daybreak by the 53d Division (Welsh). This infantry division had taken Hill 1070 by 8.45 a. m. Two other infantry divisions about noon attacked the Turkish

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positions between Wadi Saba and the Khalasa road. This attack was not progressing well, and in the afternoon consideration was given the question of breaking off the engagement, when it became known that Beersheba itself had been entered by the cavalry, which, starting the night before, had circled the town to the east and attacked from the northeast. The infantry attack was, therefore, continued, and by nightfall the last of the Turkish redoubts on this part of the field had been captured.

CAPTURE OF BEERSHEBA BY THE CAVALRY

While the infantry were attacking southwest of Beersheba assisted by the Imperial Camel Brigade, the main body of cavalry, composed of the Australian Light Horse, the New Zealand Rifles, and the Yeomanry, had started from their bases at Sha'uth and Shellal on the night of October the 27th and had ridden in a southeasterly direction to Kha Lasa and Ashuj. Remaining at these places until October 30th, they again set out that evening, and after a night ride of over thirty miles they reached by 5.00 a. m. on the 31st the high ground east of Beersheba. No enemy had been encountered, and, seizing the advantage which they had gained by completely surprising the Turks, dispositions were at once made for an attack.

The Australians and the New Zealanders were ordered into action and the Yeomanry Division held as a reserve. One detachment was sent north to secure positions on the Hebron road and a second detachment was dispatched from the Anzac Division to attack Tel-es-Saba. Both of these detachments fought all day, succeeding in a general way in accomplishing their missions, especially the attacking force sent against Tel-es-Saba, which by a dismounted attack captured the town late in the afternoon.

Various attempts meanwhile had been made to force a way into Beersheba itself, but without success, until just before dark the 4th Brigade of Australian Light Horse, after having cleaned up the village of Saba, charged across the open plain into the town.

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TROOPS ENGAGED

The cavalry which had thus played such a decisive part in the capture of Beersheba was known as the Desert Mounted Corps. It consisted of

- (a) The Australian Mounted Division,
- (b) The Anzac Mounted Division,
- (c) The Yeomanry Division,
- (d) The 7th Mounted Brigade, and
- (e) The Imperial Camel Brigade,

a total of approximately 18,000 horsemen.

A few words of explanation of each of these units will aid the reader in understanding better the composition of the Expeditionary Forces in Palestine.

The Australian light horse and the New Zealand mounted rifles are classed as mounted infantry. The British yeomanry are armed with the sword and rifle in the same manner as the British regular cavalry. Their general status corresponds to that of the cavalry regiments of our organized militia.

The Australian Mounted Division consisted of two brigades of light horse and one brigade of British yeomanry; each brigade consisting of three regiments of three squadrons each. It was commanded by a British regular.

The Anzac Mounted Division consisted of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade and two brigades of Australian Light Horse, each brigade consisting of three regiments of three squadrons each. It was commanded by a New Zealand major-general pertaining to the permanent establishment of New Zealand.

The Yeomanry Division consisted of three brigades of Yeomanry, each brigade having three regiments of three squadrons each. It was commanded by a British regular.

The 7th Mounted Brigade consisted of two regiments of yeomanry of three squadrons each. It was commanded by a British regular. It was carried as a separate brigade merely because there were no other brigades with which it could be combined into another division.

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The Imperial Camel Brigade was organized as a brigade of three rifle battalions and the men rode camels. It was commanded by a British regular.

We should bear in mind the following table of approximate equivalents:

A British troop equals one of our platoons.

A British squadron equals about two of our troops.

A British regiment equals a large squadron in our service.

Their brigade equals one of our regiments.

Their division of three brigades equals about two of our brigades.

The word "cavalry" has been applied to all the horse mounted troops of the Desert Mounted Corps because they are in effect cavalry. It is a waste of time to say mounted this and mounted that, when speaking of troops which are really cavalry and which in this campaign performed cavalry functions, even to the extent of delivering mounted attacks.

ATTACK OF THE 4TH AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE AT BEERSHEBA

The brigade was assembled in a valley, with the exception of the 11th Light Horse Regiment, which was on detached duty about two miles away.

The brigadier and brigade major, accompanied by the commanding officer of the 4th and 12th Light Horse Regiments, went forward to reconnoiter the most suitable ground for the approach of the brigade to the point of deployment.

The brigade was ordered to move as soon as ready, which it did shortly after 4.00 p. m.

The charge was made with the rifle slung on the back, its customary place, each man holding his bayonet in his right hand and leaning forward in the position of "charge saber." The length of the blade of this bayonet is 17 inches. They charged in three lines with four yards' interval between troopers. They covered the distance of $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles over gently rolling ground at the gallop.

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They were under machine-gun fire on their left flank, but their battery silenced this in less than two minutes, after the first shot was fired. A certain amount of shell fire and rifle fire met them, but it was all high. An officer examined the captured Turkish rifles after the charge and found three-fourths of them sighted at 800-900 yards and higher. In the excitement the Turks had neglected to lower their sights.

The action in detail was as follows: The 4th Light Horse Regiment was on the right and the 12th Light Horse Regiment on the left, the 11th Light Horse Regiment coming along later as a reserve. It was delayed on other duty, as a matter of fact. The leading squadron of the 4th Light Horse, or right regiment, jumped the Turkish trenches in their front and went on. The Turks in the trenches signified surrender, but after the squadron jumped over them they picked up their rifles and began shooting the Australians in the back. Just at this time the second squadron galloped up and dismounted (some of them of the parapet) and finished these Turks with the rifle. In the meantime the leading squadron, which had jumped the trenches, encountered what was the bivouac of the enemy's reserve at this point and had to fight them among their tents and dugouts. By this time the third squadron had come up, galloped around the right of these trenches, and gone to the assistance of the first squadron among the tents and dugouts.

In the meantime the first squadron of the left regiment galloped up to within about 100 yards of the trenches in its front, dismounted, and sent horses back with the horse-holders; then assaulted the trenches on foot.

The second squadron of the left regiment galloped through an interval in the trench system, right into the town of Beersheba, and fought it out in the streets, being quickly supported by their own third squadron, and somewhat later by the entire 11th Regiment.

The 11th Light Horse Regiment, which had arrived at the point of deployment after the battery had come into action, was moved forward, together with the Notts Battery and a Battery H. A. C., to Beersheba.

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On reaching that point the commanding officers of the 4th and 12th Regiments reported that they had captured the place. The 11th Regiment was accordingly ordered to push through the town and hold it against any counter-attacks by the Turks from the north, west, and southwest.

This was carried out and the 11th Regiment captured about 400 prisoners, who were retreating from the southeast.

The 4th and 12th Regiments were ordered to withdraw from their line and reorganize.

When this was done the 4th A. L. H. Regiment took up an outpost line from the Wadi-es-Saba to the mosque, and the 11th Regiment from the mosque to the Khalasa road, the 12th Regiment being held in reserve near the railway viaduct.

The two batteries were placed in position near the bank of the wadi south of the town, so as to co-operate in driving back any counter-attacks by the Turks.

The brigade remained disposed as above until relieved by the 7th Mounted Brigade and the infantry the following morning.

All ranks behaved in a most admirable manner and fearlessly charged several successive trenches at a gallop, in many cases in the face of severe machine-gun and rifle fire.

The rapidity of the attack seemed to demoralize the Turks and also avoided their artillery fire. About 5.00 p. m. two enemy planes passed over, dropped bombs, and on returning one flew low and machine-gunned brigade headquarters personnel, signal troops, and pack riders, doing no damage, however, beyond one horse wounded.

The Australian casualties were 64 killed and wounded. The Turks lost 700 men captured, 10 field guns, and 4 machine-guns.

The charge was a perfect example of that type of cavalry action which seeks to use the swiftness of the horse to cross a fire-swept zone with a minimum loss, and then to defeat the enemy with rifle fire. It must be borne in mind that these trenches had no wire in front of them. They were a part of the trench system on the extreme left of the Turkish Palestine front, and no doubt the Turk believed no troops would be able to march around that far and be able to deliver an effective attack against the troops which he

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could concentrate by using his interior lines. He overlooked the marching power of cavalry, the surprise attack, and the mounted charge.

THE TURK FALLS BACK

The general plan of the campaign contemplated that Beersheba must be captured in one day if the subsequent operations were to be developed to the maximum of success. It was this charge which captured Beersheba and made it possible to continue further operations according to the original plan.

On November 1 Irish troops moved to Abu Irgeig, on the road to Sheriah, and the 53d Division and the Camel Brigade moved due north from Beersheba about 12 or 13 miles. The Yeomanry, Australian, and New Zealand Cavalry were sent up the Hebron road. There was a great deal of fighting in the hills on November 2d and 3d. By the evening of the 3d it had been determined that the Turks were entrenched along the line Tel Khuweilfeh to Ain Kohleh. The Turks made several strong attacks in this part of the field on November 4th and 5th, in an effort to draw British troops to this front. These attacks were beaten off by the cavalry, which had been stationed to protect the left flank of the British.

Meantime, on the 3d and 4th, the British attacked Gaza in order to conceal the next phase of their campaign, viz., the attack on the line from Sheriah to Hereira.

On November 6th the infantry from Abu Irgeig attacked toward Sheriah, while the 53d Division attacked Tel Khuweilfeh. The Yeomanry were engaged at Sheriah dismounted, at the north end of the position. Most of the casualties of this fight were suffered by the Yeomanry, who early in the day carried the trenches in their front. By evening Sheriah was in the hands of the British, Tel Khuweilfeh was captured, and the Turks were in retreat from this line.

The mounted troops had been held ready for the pursuit, but the fighting had not opened the way on the 6th, but on the 7th the cavalry moved out, following the Turks toward Huj and Jamameh. The Turkish resistance which was encountered during

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this pursuit was the flank guard of the Turkish army, which was withdrawing from the entire position.

On November 8th the Turks were pressed hard from both Sheriah and Gaza. Hardly had the British entered Gaza on the 7th than the Indian cavalry moved toward Beit Hanun, which place was the terminus of the Jerusalem-Gaza Railroad. It had been the headquarters of the Turkish army.

The Indian cavalry and Scotch infantry drove the Turks out of Beit Hanun, while the Yeomanry and London infantry entered Huj, which was the advance depot of the Turks. The infantry commander, observing a Turkish column on the march about 2,500 yards away, ordered the Yeomanry to charge.

The charge was made by about 300 of the Yeomanry (10 troops) over 1,000 yards of very gently rolling country, treeless, like Beersheba. They charged in three lines, using the regulation British cavalry sword. Twelve guns, Krupp 77's, were opposed to them, and eight of these guns were in action. Supported by artillery and infantry fire, they charged in among the gunners and put them to the sword, capturing eleven of the guns. Then they continued on to another crest, about 500 yards beyond, and captured four machine-guns which were in action against them. The Yeomanry lost 60 men, killed and wounded.

This charge was an example of using cavalry mounted action and a bold surprise stroke to clean up rear-guard artillery, which had been holding up the infantry advance. There was no wire in front of the guns. The Turks were retreating too rapidly to put down wire and probably at this time had no wire with them. The charge was ordered by Major-General James Shea, a division commander, who was himself a cavalry officer and saw the opportunity.

Huj and Jammameh were captured on November 8th and the mounted troops established contact with the British forces advancing from Gaza.

On the 9th, 10th, and 11th of November the pursuit of the Turks continued. The Indian troops and the 52d Division advanced along the coast, preceded by cavalry screens. The Londoners and Yeomanry were more to the center, while the Aus-

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tralians and other mounted troops of the Desert Mounted Corps were on the right of the line. The 53d Division remained at Khuweilfeh, on the Hebron road, and did not move for nearly a month.

By the 12th the British left wing had crossed the Sukereir Wadi and in the center the Yeomanry had reached Gath (Tel-es-Safi). At this place the Yeomanry were attacked by the Turks before the infantry had caught up. With odds of 10 to 1 against them, the Yeomanry held their position until the infantry arrived and relieved them. Farther east the Australian Light Horse took up a wide front and stopped all Turkish counter-attacks.

The defense of railroad junction centered around Katrah and El Mughar. The 52d Division and the Yeomanry attacked, but were not making satisfactory progress until the Yeomanry were sent to attack El Mughar from the north.

THE ATTACK ON EL MUGHAR

This was a remarkable and very successful charge, made by 1,000 Yeomanry (6th Brigade) against about 1,200 Turkish infantry, intrenched on the top of a range of hills about 150 feet high. The Turks had two field guns (Krupp 77's) and fifteen machine-guns. All the guns, machine-guns, and 1,096 Turks were captured. The loss of the position itself affected definitely the whole Turkish line. The Yeomanry loss was 129 killed and wounded, and about 150 horses killed.

The charge was made on the left of the 52d British Division and in co-operation with that organization, which was itself attacking the adjoining village and ridge of Katrah.

The Yeomanry in charging El Mughar Hill had to cross a flat plain about 4,000 yards wide, doing the first half of the distance at the trot and the second half at the gallop; then up the hill 150 feet high, the slope being about twenty degrees. The ascent is difficult, even in quiet moments. About twenty horses, wounded going up the hill or on the crest, did not fall until they had passed some twenty yards over the crest.

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For this charge the Yeomanry had in line two regiments, each in three lines, with the third regiment in support. The total front was 1,500 yards, with four yards between troopers. The weapon used was the sword. They were under shell, rifle, and machine-gun fire, all of which was wild as they crossed the plain, although while crossing about fifty horses dropped. Near the foot of the hill their losses began to increase. One troop dismounted right at the foot of the hill to fight on foot against a certain machine-gun, but their horses were caught by another machine-gun and thirty of them went down in a heap; some six or seven men were hit also at this place.

The artillery and machine-guns of the Yeomanry co-operated very effectively. The guns of the 52d Division may possibly have fired onto this hill. One is not positive about this and is inclined to doubt it, because just at this time the 52d was finding Katrah a very hard nut to crack, especially with El Mughar on its flank. The 52d was in fact held up for the time being, and this charge was a desperate way to smash the resistance of a tenacious enemy. That it succeeded is most remarkable, and the more one studies the El Mughar position the more one is astonished; but it shows what can be done with luck, dash, and courage.

The Turkish officers, when questioned after their capture, made the following comment on the charge: "We were amazed and alarmed, because we could not believe our eyes. We had been taught that such a thing was impossible, and that no one would even dream of attempting it; yet now we saw this very thing being done. We did not know what to do."

One should bear in mind that the Turks were intrenched on top of this range of hills, but had no wire in front of their trenches. They had been retreating at least every other day for two weeks. They were not well fed and probably were low in spirit.

After the loss of El Mughar the Turkish resistance weakened on the whole line. By evening they were in general retreat, part going north and part east, toward Jerusalem. El Tineh had been captured by the Australians. The British moved into Junction Station on November 14 and the Turkish army was definitely

THE ROUT OF THE TURKS BY ALLENBY'S CAVALRY

split in two. Only on a line considerably north could the two parts be united. A distinct stage in the campaign had been finished. A Turkish army of nine divisions and one cavalry division had been defeated and pursued. Over 9,000 prisoners and large quantities of supplies had been captured.

JERUSALEM IS CAPTURED

Jerusalem was the next objective of the British. It was necessary, however, to first make the British left flank safe. The occupation of the country up to Jaffa was essential. The Turkish forces which had gone north had retreated only a few miles and their artillery was shelling Junction City. Accordingly, on November 14 mounted troops, followed by infantry, marched toward Ramleh and Ludd. On November 15 there was the fourth of the mounted charges of this campaign in which the British showed that cavalry was not an arm of the past. A ridge 750 feet high covered the main road from Ramleh to Jerusalem and flanked the advance of the British to Ramleh. On this hill, in the village of Abu Shuseh, a Turkish rear guard was established. Infantry attacked the position from the west, while the Yeomanry moved to the south and attacked mounted. This was another instance of galloping a steep hill; but the distance covered was very short compared with that at El Mughar and the approach was over rolling ground with good cover. About 800 of the Yeomanry charged with drawn sword against about 1,000 riflemen, 10 machine-guns, and 2 field guns. The Yeomanry had 36 killed and wounded. The Turks had about the same number killed and wounded and lost 360 men, 1 field gun, and 3 machine-guns captured. The charging Yeomanry were well supported by the fire of four field guns in the beginning and by from 8 to 12 guns later; also by about 1,000 riflemen and 12 machine-guns. It was an instance of a mounted charge employed in co-operation with dismounted rifle fire and artillery fire. The principal feature of the affair was that the Yeomanry had, in the first place, gone forward dismounted, with led horses following closely, when their commander discovered that the Turks were preparing a counter-attack. Seeing the op-

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portunity, he quickly brought up his led horses, mounted, and charged the Turks when they came out from their positions.

The capture of Abu Shuskeh marked the end of the Turkish resistance in the coast region for a few days. Ramleh and Ludd were occupied. The former had been the Turkish main headquarters, and in both towns large quantities of munitions were captured. On November 16 Australian and New Zealand cavalry rode into Jappa without meeting resistance. On the following day Yeomanry were sent from Ramleh into the Judean hills toward Jerusalem. This was only a covering movement to protect the British center while munitions and roads were being prepared for the advance on Jerusalem.

The west side of the Judean hills consists of numerous spurs running generally east and west. The spurs are separated by deep valleys through which the roads run. Only one good road traverses this range, viz., the Jappa-Jerusalem road.

The Yeomanry moved out from Ramleh so soon after the defeat of the Turks at El Mughar that little opposition was met, and by the night of the 18th they had reached Beit-ur-el-Tahta (Beth Horon the Lower). On the 20th they moved toward Beituna, where they encountered such stiff resistance that their advance was stopped. Meanwhile the infantry began their advance on the Jappa-Jerusalem road, and on the 20th they had reached Kuryet El Enab. Between the 20th and 24th the British captured, and held against strong counter-attacks, Nebi Samwil and Beit-ur-el-Foka (Beth Horon the Upper). The British artillery had been delayed and the infantry were unable to make progress until the roads had been repaired, supplies brought up, and the artillery put in position to support the infantry. The British used the intervening time in consolidating their positions. It was not until December 4th that the infantry renewed their offensive.

The 53d Division had remained at Khuweilfeh, eleven miles north of Beersheba, since November 11th. On December 4 this division, with a cavalry regiment attached, moved north on the road to Hebron and Jerusalem. They encountered little resistance, entering Hebron on the 6th without opposition and occupy-

[illegible]

Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 5 10 Miles

Main Roads: _____

Railroads:

" (Location uncertain) + + + + +

JAFFA

● *EL MUGHAR*

● **KATRAM**

ET 7

DEIR SINEID

• *BEIT HANUN*

GAZA

● **HLA**

● JAHNKE

DESMEZ ATAWINEM

SHERIAN

MARZIA

● RUSHDI.

SHELLAL.

ABU ERGEIG

KARM

• EL BUGGAR.


WATI-ES-SABA

MAFFO

PALESTINE

Miles 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Miles

Main Roads: —————
 Railroads: - - - - -
 " (Location uncertain) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~





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ing Bethlehem on the 8th, after a show of resistance by the Turks. This column was delayed by bad weather.

The British forces to the north and west of Jerusalem were engaging the Turks while this column from the south were extending their lines to the east. The road leading to the north was closed by the British, but the road to Jericho was not. The Turks vacated the city on the 8th, and thus ended the campaign against Jerusalem.

(To be continued)

The Operations Division, War Department General Staff

BY

Colonel WALTER SCHUYLER GRANT, General Staff Corps

I

IT FELL to my lot not long ago to make a study of the workings of the Operations Division, General Staff, at the War Department. The object of this study was to suggest modifications in its existing organization, and the transfer to other divisions of the War Department General Staff of such functions performed therein as did not seem to properly belong there, and a similar transfer to the Operations Division of functions performed by other divisions.

In approaching the problem the attitude was adopted that the organization of the Operations Division was wrong, and that it performed many functions which should be performed by other divisions of the General Staff or by the services.

With such a mode of attack every principal function of the Operations Division was illuminated by the cold light of criticism. As a result three facts emerged in bold relief:

The first was: That the Operations Division was not an artificial organization, to which various duties and functions had arbitrarily been assigned, but was a hand-fashioned organization which had been gradually developed to perform certain functions closely related and quite inextricably intertwined.

The second fact was: That some functions now performed by the Operations Division, and which seemed at first glance to be manifestly the duty of some service, were the ghosts of some very real and highly important General Staff functions which had existed during the war and which should remain in the Operations Division in time of peace as a germ for expansion to their proper proportions in war.

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And the third fact that stood out was: That for every main function there are a number of dependent ones, so closely related to the parent function that smoothness of working demands that they all be handled by the same agency; but, as the dependent functions increase in distance from the main function they become identical with dependent functions springing from a main function controlled by some other agency. In other words, there is a twilight zone between the General Staff Divisions in which many matters crop up that can be handled by any General Staff section with equal propriety.

II

We might briefly run over the history of the development of the present Operations Division of the War Department General Staff.

When the war started the General Staff in Washington was divided into two parts—those members of the General Staff at the War Department, who might be termed an Executive Branch, and those on duty at the Army War College at Washington Barracks, who formed the War College Division of the General Staff. The War College Division was itself divided into committees, viz., the Organization Committee, Equipment Committee, Training Committee, Legislative Committee, and Operations Committee. The last-named committee was interested in problems of national defense and strategy, including the making of recommendations as to the utilization and movements of existing organizations—in other words, in recommending troop movements in the United States and to and from our outlying possessions. When we entered the war we concentrated all our efforts on whipping Germany. At the same time all strategic plans connected therewith became a function of the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces or of the Supreme War Council, and other plans for national defense remaining under the jurisdiction of the Operations Committee were not of pressing necessity or importance, except as they dealt with our seaboard or southern frontier. Consequently the Operations Committee found itself chiefly occu-

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pied with questions connected with shipment of troops abroad and their procurement in the types of organization desired.

In line with these duties, about the middle of September, 1917, the Operations Committee of the War College Division, acting under instructions from the Chief of Staff, had drawn up a schedule for the shipment of certain specially designated divisions. In this schedule the shipment of certain numbers of unspecified auxiliary troops in each of the months of September, October, and November, 1917, was included.

In carrying out this small military program there were, aside from the services, several agencies involved, viz.:

(a) The Operations Committee, War College Division. This committee amplified its original schedule by designating specific units of auxiliary troops to go in September, in October, and in November. It organized tactical divisions and other units to go by designating the organizations in the United States which were to compose them, and it organized new types of units that were to go, such as the trains, by designating the manner in which men and officers would be drawn from existing organizations for amalgamation into these new type units.

(b) The office of the Chief of Embarkation Service, in which the principal assistant was a General Staff officer, who was considered as a member of the Operations Committee, War College Division.

(c) A board of three officers at the War Department, which controlled the priority of equipment of troops and of which the executive member was also a member of the Operations Committee, War College Division.

(d) A committee of three officers at the War Department, which controlled, under the close supervision of the Chief of Staff, the calling and assignment of the draft, and which was composed of a member of the Operations Committee, a member of the Equipment Committee, and a member of the Organization Committee, War College Division.

The last two of these agencies developed partially as the result of an attempt to cut down the time taken in handling papers and partially as the result of a desire on the part of the Chief of

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Staff to have the assistance of a group of staff officers that could work under his close supervision and direction in the solution of many new and unforeseen problems. All four of these agencies constituted the germ of the present Operations Division, which ultimately absorbed the Equipment Committee of the War College Division, became reorganized at the War Department, and, with certain readjustments, became charged with the function of carrying out our enlarged military program.

III

The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff is now divided into three branches, viz.:

Operations Branch,
Personnel Branch, and
Equipment Branch.

The Operations Branch is divided into the Troop Movement Section, the Enlisted Personnel Section, and the Miscellaneous Section.

The Personnel Branch handles only commissioned personnel; it has nothing to do with enlisted and civilian personnel.

The Equipment Branch is also divided into three sections, as follows: The Construction Section, handling matters connected with construction and real estate; the Equipment and Invention Section, handling matters connected with the investigation of inventions and with the types and allowances of equipment, and a Miscellaneous Section.

The Personnel Branch is divided into the Procurement and Discharge Section, the Administration Section, and the Promotions and Assignments Section.

IV

Those whose experience abroad has led them to the belief that the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff corresponds to the Operations Section, or G-3, of the General

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Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces in France must correct that impression. It does not. The Operations Division in Washington corresponds quite closely to the G-1 of our General Staff in France. The only seemingly striking point of similarity between the Operations Division here and the Operations Section (or G-3) as it existed abroad is in the matter of troop movements handled by both of them.

But even this striking point of similarity, if closely examined, will be seen, as a matter of fact, to be not a point of similarity at all.

In France, as we have said, troop movements were a function of G-3; but military police were handled by G-1. The troop movements, presided over in this country by the Operations Division, are in the main military police movements, pure and simple; and the troops that are moved are, with the exception of those placed at ports of embarkation for an overseas war and those placed at concentration camps, where they come under the control of a commanding general in the field, for a continental war, military police organizations for domestic uses.

There are other reasons why troop movements are fixed as a function of the Operations Division of the General Staff of the War Department.

It may be remembered that earlier in this paper it was shown that the Operations Committee of the War College Division recommended and prepared orders for troop movements in the United States and to and from our outlying possessions. When the Operations Committee became absorbed in the newer Operations Division, this function was naturally also absorbed, and conditions that arose made it most unwise to transfer the function to any other General Staff division. These conditions had reference to the problems of transportation.

The Operations Division superintended the calling of the draft, its organization into units, and their shipment to the ports. To distribute the successive increments of the draft to the cantonments from the local boards was a problem in transportation of more than local dimensions; but this problem was further complicated by the necessity of making at approximately the same times

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considerable transfers of men from camp to camp, transporting to the ports organizations destined for overseas, transferring specialists, etc. The ordinary troop movements, based on domestic requirements, or those of our overseas possessions were completely swallowed up in the immense movements of men, animals, and material of war required by the emergency. All these movements created a very complex railroad transportation problem. To simplify the solution of this problem it was essential to have all requirements for troop movements come to the Transportation Department from a single General Staff agency.

It would therefore seem as if the Operations Division is the proper agency for handling such troop movements as are supervised by the War Department. But there is no reason why the G-1 of an army should therefore have to handle them instead of G-3. The War Department problem of troop movements is entirely different from that of a combatant unit, such as an army.

It is interesting to trace other analogies between the G-1 overseas and the Operations Division at home. Take the following case:

From the moment we adopted the policy of sending troops abroad, the Operations Division, or one of the agencies from which it sprang, supervised their procurement, whether it was from existing organizations of the National Guard or Regular Army or whether it was from the raw material obtained through the draft. The supervision of the draft, or mobilization, became one of the principal functions of operations, and with the supervision of procurement came, as a closely dependent function, the supervision of the places where the draft could be housed—in other words, the supervision of camps, posts and stations, including matters connected with construction and real estate.

If the Operations Division were to procure men, they must have a place to put them. The situation corresponded to "purchase and storage," in which, again, the term "storage" corresponds to the old expression "billets and billeting," so common in the various tables showing the distribution of duties assigned G-1.

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V

The Enlisted Personnel Section of the Operations Branch and the Personnel Branch handle two very important duties of the Operations Division. The first controls matters connected with enlisted and civilian personnel; the second supervises the commissioned personnel.

One very interesting feature of the work of the Enlisted Personnel Section that developed during the war was in the matter of handling specialists for the hundreds of units of special and technical troops that had to be formed in a hurry.

The draft naturally brought many men of specialized knowledge and training into the Army. In order that round pegs might be put in round holes, it became necessary to classify these men in such a way that they could be matched against requests from organizations for different types of specialists. A Committee on the Classification of Personnel was organized as a part of the Adjutant General's Department. This committee devised a scheme for classifying the men received through the draft in terminology that was made standard, both for purposes of requisition and supply.

Accordingly, when men were brought in under the draft they were classified in the Depot Brigades which constituted the gates through which the raw material was passed into the organized forces, and reports showing these classifications were sent to the War Department. Here these reports were tabulated by the Committee on the Classification of Personnel, which operated under the immediate supervision and direction of the Enlisted Personnel Section of the Operations Branch of the Operations Division. To this same committee came all requisitions for enlisted men, and, based on the priorities as established by the Enlisted Personnel Section, the committee drew up the orders of assignment after matching the requisitions against the tabulated reports.

The Personnel Branch was made necessary by the tremendous increase in the number of officers. The sources of supply were so diverse, the requirements so exacting, the matter of assignment of so broad a scope, and the problems of policy so many and varied that a centralized and uniform control was necessary.

Crossing of Streams by Small Detachments of Cavalry

BY

Colonel N. F. McCLURE, 11th Cavalry
(Brigadier-General, National Army)

THIS SUBJECT is one of extreme importance to the cavalryman of today. On almost every reconnaissance occasion will arise where streams must be crossed under unusual circumstances, while in time of war a cavalry detachment would be confronted with some problem of this kind almost every day and often several times in the same day. In this discussion, unless otherwise stated, it will be assumed that pack-mules will be able to follow the horses. The subject will be considered under four heads: *Fording, Swimming, Ferrying, Bridging.*

FORDING

This is the simplest and probably the most primitive method of crossing streams. The following conditions must exist in order that the crossing may constitute a ford:

- (a) The water must be shallow enough to admit of crossing without swimming.
- (b) The bottom must be free of quicksand and not boggy.
- (c) The current must not be too rapid.
- (d) The approaches and points of egress must be good.

Before entering deep water the animals should be watered; otherwise they may stop to drink *en route*, thus producing delay, disorder, and even danger, if the stream has a muddy or quicksandy bottom. The depth of water should not in any case be over five feet, and this must be less if the current is strong and there are dangerous rapids below. In a very swift stream, full of

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boulders, three and one-half feet is about the greatest depth that can be passed without danger of horses falling and being swept down-stream. Pack-mules are sometimes overturned in such a stream by the current striking the packs and rolling the animals over. Where there is danger of this, each mule should be led with a lariat about his neck. Unless this is done, he will be very liable to drown if he loses his footing. With the rope around the neck or snapped in the halter ring, the animal can be towed ashore.


The difficulty of fording is much increased by the danger of bogging in muddy places or of getting into quicksands. If there be time to reconnoiter, a place can generally be found in almost every stream where these dangers are lacking. They are rarely present in mountain streams, which generally flow over boulders and beds of coarse gravel. Even where there is fine sand, if it be interspersed with particles of gravel as large as a hazelnut, it may generally be assumed that the bottom is safe to ford. The danger from quicksands is much lessened if animals are pushed along and not allowed to loiter. Clear streams are somewhat deceptive as to depth. Great care must be exercised in boggy streams, which are usually also muddy and the nature of their bottoms uncertain. In such cases it is often advisable to send in a good swimmer to investigate. He may be mounted on a well-trained horse or go afoot. If afoot and the stream be swift, he should have a rope fastened about his waist or held in his hand and held by some one upstream on shore, so that if swept off his feet he can be towed ashore.

In rapid streams, if any attempt is made to march directly on the point of egress, the horses will unconsciously work down-stream with the current and may get into deep water below the ford. In such cases, each man should keep his eye fixed on a point 30 degrees or more up-stream above the intended point of egress, the horses being in echelon in oblique formation, their heads pointing 30 degrees up-stream above said point. If there are pack-mules, each should be led by a well-mounted trooper. If infantry is to use the same ford, and is at hand, it should cross first. Where streams are so that infantry can ford them, the


CROSSING OF STREAMS BY SMALL DETACHMENTS OF CAVALRY

cavalry can generally find another fording place a little above or below the main ford, and thus save time and avoid damaging the infantry ford.

A similar course of reasoning applies to fords to be used by wheeled vehicles. The swifter the current, the more shallow must be the ford to be passable. Approaches can generally be found. The main difficulty is to find points of egress nearly opposite those where the ford begins. In many cases the banks are so high and steep that this is a difficult problem. The best place to ford is usually at a rapids free from large boulders. An island in mid-stream often simplifies the matter considerably. The shallow water generally runs over a rapid beginning at a point on shore at a distance up-stream above the island equal to the distance of the island from the shore and extending diagonally down-stream to the upper end of the island. It then turns and goes diagonally up-stream to the opposite shore (Fig. I).



Water running under a high, concave bank is generally very deep, while that running around a low convex point is usually shallow. Advantage is often taken of this to cross a stream diagonally that would be unfordable in going directly over (Fig. II).



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In wide or muddy streams the route of the ford must be in some way indicated. Boulders sticking up in the stream, trees or stones on the shore, stakes driven in the bottom, sandbars, islands, rapids, and mounted men on quiet horses stationed at intervals along are some of the methods used for this purpose. In short fords, over comparatively narrow streams, the ford is sufficiently indicated by tracks of wheels and horses' hoofs, particularly at points of entrance and egress.

The ordinary woodsman or mountaineer will cross a stream which he knows, making half a dozen changes of direction, without wetting his horse's belly, while one unacquainted with the place would probably be over his depth before he was well under way. One point about fords to be guarded against is the fact that they often change after freshets. In such cases they should be newly reconnoitered. Crossing fords with wagons will be mentioned under the head of bridges.

SWIMMING

In cases of narrow, deep, swift streams, one of the easiest methods of crossing is by towing. A suitable place is selected with a tree handy on the opposite bank. Two men then cross. This may be accomplished by a foot-bridge, foot-log, boat, each riding a barebacked horse that understands swimming, or swimming with a rope around the waist or held in the hand. A rope is tied around the neck of an animal to be taken over and a half turn is taken with it about the tree by the two men on the opposite shore, who have already crossed. The animal is then forced in, and the current and his own swimming swings him over, one man assisting him to land while the other takes up the slack and keeps the rope taut. The saddles, packs, etc., can generally be left on the animals. The men may be towed over in a similar manner. If there is much danger, packs had better be removed from pack-mules before putting them in the water. Things which it is desired should be kept dry may be slid over on a rope stretched between two trees or may be wrapped in a good slicker and towed over quickly. The method here described can be used over small

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streams only. A foot-log can often be constructed by felling a tree across the stream at a suitable point, or one may be found which has been washed down or blown down. If the stream is wide and deep and no ferries or bridges exist, then it will generally be necessary to resort to swimming. Horses will usually follow a leader across any ordinary stream. A single man riding a swimming horse will often be followed by a whole herd. The men, saddles, equipment, etc., are taken over in boats. If there are no boats available, then men swim alongside their horses on the downstream side with one hand on the mane, using the other to guide the horse by pulling on the cheek-piece of his bridle or halter. Should the horse turn too far, the rider must slip over his back and pull the opposite cheek-piece. A good sensible horse must be in the lead; better two or three. In case there *are* boats, horses may be led, and thus cross, swimming alongside of the boat, a man on board leading them by a halter. In this case articles of equipment and arms that might be damaged by the water can be put in the boat. In swimming, curb bridles should generally be removed and no loose ropes, lariats, reins, or halter shanks left dangling to catch the horses' feet.

Well-trained horses with light packs can swim short distances with the rider in the saddle. This is not true if horses are not trained or packs are heavy or distance great.

FERRYING

I shall here consider all methods of crossing by means of boats, from the ordinary steam ferry-boat to the most primitive raft. The steam ferry-boats and steam and naphtha launches need no explanation. The commonest type of ferry-boat is that found along our rivers in the Western States, it being operated by the force of the current. A flatboat large enough to hold a wagon and six mules is used. A rope fastened to each end of the boat runs over the lower wheel of a double pulley. The upper wheel of this pulley runs on a cable stretched across the stream at a considerable height above the water. The boat is provided with a strong rudder, and the best results are obtained when the keel of

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the boat makes an angle of 55 degrees with the direction of the current. This is brought about by the proper use of the rudder. In sluggish streams flatboats, pushed by men using long poles against the bottom, are often available. Rafts so constructed of logs, casks, old timbers, etc., may also be used and, if time admits, can be made large enough to carry wagons and animals. It is usually best to let the animals swim beside the raft, or else have them swim after a trained leader, as described under the head of "swimming," above.

BRIDGING


On account of the element of time, this method is generally resorted to only after other methods have been found impracticable. It will usually be unnecessary to bridge streams encountered unless there are wagons along with the detachment. This increases the difficulty very much, especially if fording be the means selected for crossing, and, on account of the element of time, this is the method that should be used if a suitable ford exists. In such cases the water and mud together must not be over three feet in depth; there must be good approaches, both to and from the ford, and the bottom must be firm and free of bogs and quicksands. If the place is very bad, it may be necessary to unload the wagons, carry their contents over on foot-logs, foot-bridges, in boats, or, in extreme cases, even by hand. If it be necessary, on account of the depth or swiftness of the stream, to unhitch the animals, then an empty wagon may be dragged over by means of ropes attached to it and pulled by either the men or horses. The lariats carried by the cavalymen are very useful for this purpose as well as for towing animals, lashing trestles, rafts or bridge timbers, etc. Field picket lines may be used for a similar purpose. If two logs can be felled near together across a stream, a bridge may be constructed by filling in between the logs with brush and earth or by cutting short poles and laying them crosswise. Troopers may cross on a single log, towing their mounts, which swim alongside. Trestles composed of timbers lashed together and weighted down with rocks are often used for supports. Sometimes an empty wagon run

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into the stream forms a center pier for a bridge of two spans. If boats are available, an improvised pontoon bridge may be constructed.

Colonel C. A. P. Hatfield, of the 4th Cavalry, once made use of a peculiar bridge under circumstances that are considered worth mentioning. He was in charge of a wagon train and came to a stream that could be approached only at the point where he encountered it. Hills and side cañons interfered with his going either up or down stream very far. The creek in question he found to be about three feet deep, but the banks eight feet high and twelve feet apart and very crumbly.

FIGURE III



There was too much water to make a dam and it would have required 100 cubic yards of excavation to have dug approaches in ground that would not have held up a heavy load, even had he possessed the necessary tools. Cottonwoods thirty feet in height grew along the stream, and Colonel Hatfield selected a number of these and cut them into strong poles about 16 feet in length and made a hurdle, as shown in the figure, strengthening it by two poles crossing the crotches and having the ends lashed together two and two. This was made eight feet wide and put across the chasm. The loose ends of the poles abutted against the banks on either side. On top the hurdle was filled in with the cottonwood branches, some earth was thrown on top, and in two hours after arriving on the ground the wagon train was across and *en*

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route. If additional strength had been required, forked branches could have been placed under the center of the hurdle, the lower ends resting on flat rocks on the bottom of the stream.

It is not the intention of this paper to consider the more elaborate military bridges, which would generally require materials not at the disposal of small detachments, besides taking more time in their construction than could usually be spared. Opportunities will often occur on practice marches for instructing both non-commissioned officers and men in the principles laid down in this paper, and all advantage should be taken of such occasions.

CONCLUSION

The above discussion shows the paramount importance of teaching men and horses in the cavalry to swim. This should never be neglected. It will add much to the efficiency and boldness of cavalry patrols and other mounted detachments to feel that they have nothing to fear when it becomes necessary to cross a stream. Previous training will give them that confidence that comes only with practice and training.

Automatic Weapons

BY

Lieutenant-Colonel HOMER M. GRONINGER, Cavalry

AUTOMATIC WEAPONS in our service are divided by G. O. No. 91, 1918, into five general classes, as follows:

- Self-loading rifles.
- Automatic rifles.
- Machine rifles.
- Aircraft machine-guns.
- Machine-guns.

SELF-LOADING RIFLES

Self-loading rifles are those in which the recoil or powder gases are utilized to actuate the mechanism in ejecting the fired case and *loading* a fresh cartridge, but the trigger must be pulled for each shot. They have no cooling device, tripods, or rests. No weapon of this type has yet been adopted or issued in our service.

AUTOMATIC RIFLES

Automatic rifles are those in which the ejecting, loading, and firing are done automatically. Their construction and weight are such that they are, or may be, fired from the shoulder, in the same manner as the ordinary magazine rifle. Automatic rifles are usually so constructed that they can be operated either as a self-loading rifle (trigger pulled for each shot) or as an automatic rifle (continuous fire to full extent of magazine while pressure is maintained on trigger).

The automatic rifle differs from the self-loading rifle in that it possesses, in addition to the self-loading action, in which the trigger must be pulled for each shot, the power of full automatic

action, in which the rifle fires continuously to the full capacity of the magazine while the trigger is fully compressed.

In the case of the typical *self-loading* rifle, the cycle of operation consists of the unlocking of the breech mechanism, the extraction of the fired case from the chamber, the ejection of the fired case, the insertion of a loaded cartridge from the magazine into the chamber, and the locking of the breech mechanism ready to fire by pressure on the trigger.

In the case of the typical *automatic rifle*, the cycle of operation consists of the closing of the breech mechanism and at the same time the insertion of a loaded cartridge into the chamber, the locking of the mechanism, the discharge of the rifle, the unlocking of the mechanism, the extraction of the fired case, the ejection of the fired case.

It will be noticed that the typical self-loading rifle is ready to fire with a cartridge in the chamber, rifle ready and unlocked, and that it fires instantly in response to the proper pressure on the trigger. Therefore there is nothing in the self-loading feature which prevents its being fired with any less degree of accuracy than the ordinary magazine rifle.

In the typical automatic rifle, however, even when used as a self-loader only, when the trigger is pressed, the breech block first moves forward, the mechanism closing and locking, and the cartridge is then discharged. This loading and locking occurring upon the pressure of the trigger, and before discharge, sets up vibrations in the rifle, and to a certain extent disarranges the aim and hold of the marksman, and thus materially decreases the accuracy of fire as compared with that of a typical self-loading rifle or a magazine rifle.

It should be noted that an *automatic rifle* must be made to remain open without a cartridge in the chamber at the end of its cycle of operation; otherwise a heated barrel would probably cause the discharge of the cartridge in the chamber after the marksman had suspended fire. A marksman cannot fire a good self-loading rifle so rapidly and for such an extended period with the ammunition carried as to cause the barrel to heat up to that temperature which will discharge a cartridge lying in the chamber.

AUTOMATIC WEAPONS

In order to give any weapon this additional power of full automatic action, it is necessary to add several intricate parts. Full automatic action also requires that other parts of the rifle be made heavier, in order that the rifle may be fired a short time with this type of action without overheating. The Browning automatic rifle will not fire with this type of action more than 450 rounds continuously without overheating.

Types of automatic rifles are:

Browning (used in our service).

Chauchot (used in the French Army).

Hotchkiss, light (used in British and French armies).

MACHINE RIFLES

Machine rifles are automatic weapons of an intermediate class between the automatic rifle and the machine-gun. The cooling system of the machine rifle is more effective than that of the automatic rifle, as the automatic rifle has no cooling device. Hence the machine rifle is capable of maintaining a sustained fire of longer duration than the automatic rifle. Its cooling system is not of great enough efficiency, however, to permit long-sustained fire at rates of 150 or more shots per minute without an undue increase in dispersion. The weight of the machine rifle or its construction, or both, usually are such that habitually it cannot be, and is not, used as a hand arm, as is the automatic rifle. It is provided with a rest which gives increased accuracy and permits its effective use at ranges much longer than the self-loading or the automatic rifle.

The best-known type of machine rifle is the Lewis. Machine rifles might be constructed either by adding the Lewis or some other cooling device to the Browning automatic rifle or by replacing the water jacket of the Browning machine-gun with the Lewis cooling device. In any case, a light mount or rest would have to be provided. In case of the Lewis or a modified Browning automatic rifle or a modified Browning machine-gun, we have a weapon weighing about as much more than the automatic rifle as the automatic rifle weighs more than the self-loading rifle. The machine

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rifle is capable of firing with full automatic action about three times as long as the automatic rifle. The light mount permits its use with good effect at longer ranges. This increased weight with increased fire power merits our study of this weapon as a possible weapon of a cavalry regiment.

Types of machine rifles are:

- Modified Browning (automatic rifle or machine-gun).
- Lewis (used in the British army).
- Benet-Mercier (formerly used in our service).
- Hotchkiss, heavy (used in the French Army).

AIRCRAFT MACHINE-GUNS

Aircraft machine-guns are automatic weapons especially designated for mounting and use of aircraft. They will not be discussed.

Types of Aircraft machine-guns are:

- Browning, Vickers, and Marlin (all used in our service).

MACHINE-GUNS

Machine-guns are water-cooled automatic weapons, which, because of the efficiency of their cooling systems and the stability of their mounts, are capable of the most accurate and long-sustained fire at rates of 150 or more shots per minute, and this without any increase in dispersion that would endanger friendly troops over whose heads their fire may be directed.

The machine-gun is comparatively heavy when compared to other automatic guns. This increased weight is taken up to a large degree by the water jacket and the tripod. The water jacket is necessary in order that the barrel can be surrounded by water, thus giving the gun the power of *long-sustained* fire not possessed by other automatic guns. The tripod gives a fixed mounting, thus reducing the personnel factor during firing and permitting the gun to be laid for direct, indirect, overhead barrage and night firing. The rigidity of this mounting increases accuracy to such

AUTOMATIC WEAPONS

an extent that the machine-gun can be used effectively to the maximum effective range of the ammunition. It also reduces the amount of overhead clearance required. The amount of clearance varies directly with the rigidity of the mounting.

Types of machine-guns are:

Browning (used in our service).

Vickers (used in the British Army).

Maxim (used in the German Army).

The question now arises as to what automatic weapons we should have in the Cavalry Service. Do we want all of these weapons, the self-loading rifle, automatic rifle, machine rifle, and machine gun? If not, which weapons should be a part of the cavalry armament? In the study of this question, we must thoroughly comprehend the characteristics of each one and consider how each one would increase or decrease mobility and fire power and thus cavalry tactics.

Mobility and Fire Power

SELF-LOADING RIFLE

The self-loading rifle would weigh about the same as our service rifle and would, therefore, have the same mobility mounted and dismounted. The fire power would be about equal to three riflemen or one automatic rifleman. The accuracy is the same as the magazine rifle and more than the automatic rifle. No increase in the amount of ammunition carried would probably be necessary. This weapon would be carried by each soldier and be an integral part of our dismounted firing line. Its use would hasten the decision of the action, which is especially desirable in dismounted cavalry combat.

AUTOMATIC RIFLE

The automatic rifle, though capable of both semi and full automatic action, is nearly always used as a single or self-loading weapon. It weighs nearly twice as much as the self-loading rifle, thus reducing its mobility, either mounted or dismounted. If it

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has to be carried on extra-led animals, it will certainly reduce cavalry mobility on the march and reduce the speed with which it can change from mounted to dismounted action, and the reverse. An average automatic rifleman will fire 40 aimed shots per minute and an excellent automatic rifleman 60 shots per minute, using single action. In a given unit of time, more hits will be made by the use of single action than by the use of full automatic action, and this with unlimited ammunition in both cases. The fire power of this weapon using single action is the same as for the self-loading rifle. The only advantage, so far as fire power is concerned, of the automatic rifle over the self-loading rifle is the difference in moral effect produced by firing it with single action, about 60 rounds per minute, and full automatic action. Does this amount of increase in moral effect outweigh the amount of decrease in mobility caused by increased weight which may require additional pack animals in each troop? In this connection, the increased accuracy of the self-loading rifle over the automatic rifle must also be considered.

MACHINE RIFLE

The machine rifle—for example, the modified Browning—weighs more than the automatic rifle and considerably less than the machine gun. As in the case of automatic rifles, pack animals would have to be provided, thus reducing the mobility of mounted troops by practically the same amount. The fire power of this weapon, on account of the cooling device, would be about ten times that of the service rifle and three times that of the present automatic rifle. Due to stability of the light mount, the effective ranges will be greater than those of either the self-loading or the automatic rifle. This characteristic indicates that the machine rifle could either be used in the firing line or in the rear of the firing line, firing through intervals, or, in special cases, from higher ground, over the heads of the firing line. It would be light enough to accompany the firing line for a reasonable length of time. Its mobility dismounted would certainly be much greater than that of the machine-gun and about the same as the automatic rifle. The tactical use of this weapon would be as follows:

AUTOMATIC WEAPONS

- a. To increase the fire power of the firing line in order to gain fire superiority by direct fire and in special cases by overhead fire.
- b. Echeloned in depth to resist counter and flank attacks.
- c. To assist in the consolidation of positions won.

MACHINE-GUN

The machine-gun, due to its weight and the amount of ammunition necessary, requires special transportation. If machine guns were assigned as an integral of a platoon, troop, or squadron, the mobility of these units would be decreased. This is one of the reasons why we have machine-guns organized into machine-gun units as the machine-gun squad, platoon, etc. In dismounted action, it is evident that the machine gunner carrying a tripod weighing 45 pounds cannot keep up with a rifleman carrying a rifle weighing nine pounds. In dismounted action, the machine gunner must utilize every opportunity to transport his guns and ammunition by pack animals, whenever possible, otherwise in a long advance he will not keep up. The rate of advance of the firing line should not be regulated by the speed of the machine-guns. The machine gunners will have to pack their guns and ammunition after their particular mission is accomplished, and then, by increasing their speed, assume their normal place until another mission is presented. This same result may be obtained by having the machine-gun units leap-frog. In any case, during a long advance or in a pursuit, the machine gunner will be compelled to rely on his pack transportation to a great extent.

Machine-guns add greatly to the fire power of cavalry. The heavy fixed mount permits effective fire up to about 3,500 yards, delivered direct, indirect, or overhead. Machine-guns do not have to be in the firing line in order to deliver this fire. Their principal role in the advance is to *support* by fire power the advance of the firing line. This fire is delivered from positions so selected that overhead fire or fire through intervals will not endanger friendly troops. These positions may be close to the firing line or some distance in rear, depending in most cases on the amount of overhead clearance necessary. Usually they fire from positions in rear of

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the advancing firing line, taking full advantage of their ability to deliver a sustained fire accurately at long ranges with a minimum of overhead clearance for friendly troops.

CONCLUSION

In so far as the weapons described in this article are concerned, the following gives the present general armament in the Cavalry Service:

- (a) Each cavalry soldier, except the automatic rifleman and machine gunner, is armed with the service rifle.
- (b) Four automatic riflemen in each troop as an integral part of the troop.
- (c) A Machine-Gun Troop for each regiment as an integral part of the regiment.
- (d) A Brigade and a Division Machine-gun Squadron.

It is believed that the following armament would be an improvement over the present, and it is suggested for the study and consideration of all interested:

- (a) Each cavalry soldier in the troop to be armed with a self-loading rifle.
- (b) A Machine Rifle Troop assigned to each regiment.
- (c) A Brigade and Division Machine-gun Squadron.

The Future of Cavalry

BY

First Lieutenant A. J. TITTINGER, 6th Cavalry

THE NATURE of the warfare waged in the recent World War should not be taken to mean that cavalry is henceforth obsolete, nor should it be considered as minimizing its importance in future wars.

It is well to recall the great German advance in 1914. This advance was made possible only through the use of cavalry, and, conversely, the German retreat and subsequent defeat at the Marne were due to an insufficient amount of cavalry in the army group of Von Kluck (1st Corps of Cavalry), who was opposing Foch near Mailly (9th Army and 9th Cavalry Division). Had the Germans possessed more cavalry, they might have penetrated the gap between the 4th and 9th French armies with very disastrous results to the French. But unfortunately for them, their numerical inferiority as well as their inferiority of dash and spirit spelled their defeat. The French outnumbered them by at least one division, for Foch had nine divisions and one brigade, whereas the Germans had only two corps (from two to three divisions in a corps) and two separate divisions—a maximum of eight divisions.

Even the French cavalry was insufficient for any offensive action, but it was enough when they were on the defensive.

The Germans, however, who were the offensive troops, failed in their great offensive plan. Their project was shattered when victory was almost won, simply because they did not have enough cavalry to carry out their ambitious and pretentious scheme of overrunning France.

The lesson to be derived from this phase of the campaign is that in the future any nation which adopts a policy of national defense will be obliged to maintain a large cavalry force, other-

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wise the plan is unsound; for cavalry cannot be improvised to the same extent as the other arms.

There is every reason why it is essential to have a large proportion of cavalry. In the first place, a country with a weak cavalry force might just as well do without any at all, thereby saving itself from entertaining any false hopes that would otherwise be placed in it.

Again, the employment of large cavalry forces will eliminate or render impossible the so-called position warfare. The expense of maintaining cavalry is insignificant in comparison to that of stabilized warfare. Plenty of cavalry means, therefore, *open warfare*.

The claim is made that the development of aviation and radio-telegraphy, as well as the invention of poisonous gases and tanks, will relegate to oblivion any future operations of cavalry on a large scale. Such a conception is, of course, both warped and wrong. Aviation and radio-telegraphy will, on the contrary, greatly increase the value of cavalry, since they will be most efficient aids; but as for gas and tanks, their use will be restricted to siege operations or to the kind of warfare that the present war brought about, but which will hardly ever occur again.

The rôle of the Air Service and that of the cavalry go hand in hand. The mission of the former is to maintain supremacy of the air and to prevent the detection and presence of friendly troops by the enemy. *Vice versa*, it is charged with discovering the enemy's whereabouts and observing its movements. If such be the case, the arm that will benefit most materially from the activities of the Aviation Service will naturally be the cavalry, due to its position in advance and to its proximity to the enemy. If we, then, equip our cavalry with radio sets and have our aëroplanes similarly equipped, the transmission of information gained by the aërial scouts is very much simplified, and the result is that we are enabled to extend over a very much larger area the radius of action of our large cavalry forces. We thereby enhance the success of the undertaking and facilitate direction of action in the accomplishment of the mission. To be more specific, we should equip all units of the size of a squadron and larger with two radio

THE FUTURE OF CAVALRY

sets (pack), in order to enable the commander, the advanced troops, and the troops adjoining to maintain uninterrupted communication in the theater of operations.

As for the tanks, their invention has no effect whatsoever on the future of cavalry. They are invaluable in trench or siege warfare or, with our overseas garrisons, to prevent landing parties, but they have a limited radius of action and have a limited fuel capacity, furthermore, which restricts their use to local activities of either an offensive or defensive nature.

In conclusion, it can be said that the mission of cavalry is to strike deep into the invaded country with overwhelming numbers and with great rapidity, so as to reach the capital and disorganize the functions of government.

The cavalry must prevent the enemy from mobilizing his reservists by occupying immediately large portions of the enemy territory, and at the same time eliminating the resources that may be obtained by the enemy from that part of the country, so as to impose upon him an undesirable economic situation. The accomplishment of this mission will be the deciding factor in the early termination of the war; but a mission of this magnitude can only be accomplished with a large peace-time force of trained cavalry.

The nation which draws this lesson from the recent war will win the next war in which it may be engaged.

The Reserve Officers Training Corps

BY

Major PEARSON MENOHER, General Staff Corps

THE RESERVE Officers Training Corps is organized under authority of the act of Congress approved June 3, 1916 (National Defense Act), as amended by the acts of Congress approved September 6, 1916, and July 9, 1918, respectively. This legislation was prepared by the War College Division, General Staff, following the principle, for the first time laid down in military legislation, of an officer reserve for the Regular Army.

The primary object of the Reserve Officers Training Corps is to provide systematic military training in civil educational institutions for the purpose of qualifying selected students of such institutions as reserve officers in the military forces of the United States. It is intended to attain this object during the time the students are pursuing general or professional studies, with the least practical interference with their civil careers, by employing methods designed to fit them physically, mentally, and morally for the pursuits of peace as well as the pursuits of war. The general policy adopted by the War Department is to give to all students of the Reserve Officers Training Corps a thorough physical training, to inculcate in them a respect for all lawful authority, to teach them the fundamentals of the military profession, leadership, and the special knowledge required to enable them to serve efficiently in the various branches of the military service.

As there are some 570 colleges in the country, with an enrollment of 170,000 male students, the probability of obtaining a large number of trained officers from this class, superior in education and training to the average citizen, can be readily grasped.

THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

The Reserve Officers Training Corps is divided into two divisions.

- (a) A senior division, organized at civil educational institutions which require four years' collegiate study for a degree; and
- (b) A junior division, organized at any other public or private institution.

An institution which desires establishment of a unit submits an application and agrees to conform with the regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War; and, after an inspection by an officer detailed for the purpose, the application may be approved and an officer of the Army detailed as professor of military science and tactics. This officer then becomes a member of the faculty of the institution to which he is detailed.

A unit of the Reserve Officers Training Corps in any educational institution is the military organization of students pursuing the same course of military instruction: infantry, cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery, etc. The units of arms and corps other than infantry may be organized at educational institutions where the *senior* division is authorized, but such institutions must be capable of furnishing the special type of instruction required.

No unit can be established or maintained at any institutions unless there are enrolled in the military department at least 100 physically fit male students. A certificate of physical fitness is required of each student entering the R. O. T. C., as a result of an examination made by civilian physicians or medical officers of the Army specially detailed to the institution for this purpose. Physical qualifications have been outlined in an appendix to S. R. No. 65, prepared in the office of the Surgeon General.

Upon completion of the first two years in the R. O. T. C., students may sign a contract with the Government to continue the two remaining years in the R. O. T. C. while at the institution, and in return receive commutation of subsistence at the rate of 40 cents per day during the remainder of their term at the institution.


Ample equipment has been provided for units of the R. O. T. C., in accordance with Tables of Equipment contained in Appendix IV, Special Regulations No. 44. The latest model equipment is

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issued. Uniforms are furnished to students of the R. O. T. C. while at the institution, and an additional uniform is furnished while at the summer camps.

For administrative purposes, the R. O. T. C. has been placed under the control of department commanders, with officers detailed as inspectors under the officer in charge of the War Plans and Training Section of the Department General Staff. An administration section has been formed in the office of the Adjutant General of the Army at Washington, known as the R. O. T. C. Section. This section handles all matters of administration connected with the R. O. T. C., in conformity with policy outlined by a branch of the War Plans Division, General Staff, known as the R. O. T. C. Branch.

Figure I is based on the National Defense Act, which limits the number of graduates that may be commissioned in the Officers Reserve Corps to 50,000. As members of the Officers Reserve Corps may serve a period of ten years under this act, approximately five thousand should be commissioned each year.



THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

The percentage reduction shown for each year of a four years' academic course is based on the report of the Commissioner of Education and the estimated number of students who will elect to take the course at the end of the sophomore year.

The desired output of the R. O. T. C. has been apportioned among the several branches of the service in accordance with existing needs (see table below)—the percentages form the ratio of the number of officers in each branch recommended by the War Plans Division.

The percentages for the several branches of the service may later have to be changed to conform to the needs of the several branches, as shown by casualties in the late war. For the present, however, these percentages are believed to be approximately correct.

Graduates of Reserve Officers Training Corps to be Commissioned Each Year

Branch	Number	Per cent of total
Infantry	2,000	40
Field Artillery	900	18
Coast Artillery	700	14
Cavalry	450	9
Engineer	300	6
Motor Transport	300	6
Signal	150	3
Ordnance	100	2
Tank	100	2
Total.....	5,000	

It is thus seen that by far the largest proportion of the graduates are assigned to the infantry, which, of course, is as it should be; but from the viewpoint of the cavalry it might be argued that our proportion is too small. It is certainly much less than the proportion of cavalry to infantry provided in the National Defense Act, and all indications are that this law, with some modifications, will be the basis for any reorganization of the Army during the ensuing year. As far as cavalry is concerned, we have a special problem in the American Army, and it is not good judgment to adhere to strictly theoretical proportions.

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The number of students undergoing instruction in each branch needed to produce the desired output each year is shown in the table below.

Students to be Enrolled in Reserve Officers' Training Corps

Branch of service	Percentage for each arm	Total students undergoing instruction	Students in first year basic course	Students in second year basic course	Students in first year advanced course	Students in second year advanced course	Students commissioned each year
Infantry	40	17,625	6,875	5,500	2,750	2,500	2,000
Field Artillery	18	7,928	3,092	2,474	1,237	1,125	900
Coast Artillery	14	6,166	2,405	1,924	962	875	700
Cavalry	9	3,948	1,540	1,232	616	560	450
Engineer	6	2,641	1,030	824	412	375	300
Motor Transport	6	2,641	1,030	824	412	375	300
Signal Corps	3	1,301	507	406	203	185	150
Ordnance	2	878	342	274	137	125	100
Tank Corps	2	878	342	274	137	125	100
Total	100	44,006	17,163	13,732	6,866	6,245	5,000
Per cent loss....	20	50	9	20

In order to secure the necessary output for each branch of the service, the following number of units has been recommended:

Cavalry	15	Signal Corps	12
Field Artillery	22	Motor Transport Corps..	0
Infantry	—	Ordnance	10
Coast Artillery	20	Junior	—
Engineer Corps	19		

Because of the existing commitments of the War Department, it has been found impracticable, up to the present time, to make the infantry units correspond to the percentages recommended.

No policy was adopted to determine the number of junior units of the R. O. T. C. that should be established. The number is limited because of the limitation placed by the National Defense Act of the number of officers that may be detailed to educational institutions. For the present, the establishment of junior units has been discontinued. The number of applications became so large that it was impossible for the War Department to detail a sufficient number of officers to properly conduct training.


THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

In carrying out the foregoing policy, the following number of units have been established to date:

Cavalry	11	Motor Transport Corps..	9
Field Artillery	22	Ordnance	2
Infantry	129	Junior	127
Coast Artillery	20		
Engineer Corps	18	Total.....	350
Signal Corps	12		

The distribution of units of the R. O. T. C. by departments is as indicated in Figure II.

FIGURE II



Department	Number of institutions	Number of units		
		Senior	Junior	Total
Northeastern	17	18	6	24
Eastern	48	50	15	65
Southeastern	52	38	28	66
Central	88	81	49	130
Southern	13	10	10	20
Western	33	25	17	42
Hawaiian	2	0	2	2
Total	253	222	127	349

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Although the Reserve Officers Training Corps was authorized by the National Defense Act in June, 1916, no great development took place until after the Armistice, in 1918.

Since that time there has been a great expansion; and, although it requires three years to obtain the enrollment necessary to approximate the original requirements established by the War Department (Figure I), it is believed that present conditions are very favorable, and that the original requirements will be met within the next few years.

The enrollment in the R. O. T. C. at present is as indicated below:

Senior units	Students enrolled	Per cent of total
Infantry	46,424	78.6
Field Artillery	5,389	9.1
Coast Artillery	3,142	5.3
Engineers	2,055	3.5
Signal Corps	799	1.3
Cavalry	741	1.3
Motor Transport Corps	524	.9
Ordnance	13	...
Total	59,087	
Junior units	57,278	
Aggregate	116,365	

The enrollment in the senior division by courses is indicated herewith:

Students Enrolled in Senior Units, by Courses

Course	Number	Per cent of total
Basic	54,519	92.3
Advanced	4,568	7.7
Total	59,087	

The National Defense Act limits the numbers of officers that may be detailed to educational institutions to 300 officers of not less than five years' commissioned service. Legislation authorized for detail during the emergency 1,000 officers of not less than one year's commissioned service, but with the early prospect of an official peace advantage cannot be taken of the additional number authorized.

THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

The policy with reference to the assignment of officers is as follows:

- a. At least one officer is assigned to each senior unit and junior unit of the Reserve Officers Training Corps. The number of senior units of any branch of the service and the number of junior units may not exceed the number at which the desired standard of instruction can be maintained with the number of officers allotted.
- b. The number of officers allotted to any branch of the service for duty with the senior units of that branch of the service is based upon the percentage of the total output for that arm.
- c. Not more than one officer is assigned to junior units until the needs of all institutions maintaining senior units of the R. O. T. C. are provided for.
- d. No officers are detailed at institutions operating under section 56, National Defense Act of June 3, 1916, until the needs of all institutions maintaining units of the R. O. T. C. are provided for.
- e. In the case of the larger institutions, where two or more senior units are maintained, one of the officers detailed is of field rank.
- f. In the relief and discharge of officers, it is the policy to retain officers of all arms, so that there may be in the R. O. T. C. at all times the same proportion of officers of each arm and of each grade as exists in the several arms of the service, viz: Infantry, 40 per cent; Field Artillery, 18 per cent; Coast Artillery, 14 per cent; Cavalry, 9 per cent, etc.
- g. The policies in the preceding paragraphs indicate the ultimate objective which it is desired to attain, but for the present existing commitments render it necessary to distribute the personnel in such a manner as to prevent an undue disturbance of the existing situation.

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The non-commissioned officer authorized by the National Defense Act for detail to duty with units of the R. O. T. C. are additional in their respective grades to those authorized for the Army, but the total number so detailed may not exceed 500. Other enlisted men so detailed are not additional in their respective grades to those authorized for the Army and must be carried on detached service. The number of non-commissioned officers allotted to each arm of service is as follows: Infantry, 200; Cavalry, 45; Field Artillery, 90; Coast Artillery, 70; Engineer, 40; Motor Transport Corps, 30; Signal Corps, 15; Medical Corps, one per unit. In allotting non-commissioned officers to educational institutions of the R. O. T. C., preference is given to those maintaining units of the Senior Division.

The status of the personnel in the R. O. T. C. at present is shown below:

Officers, by Grades

Grade	With schools	Supervisors	In Washington	Total	Percentage
Major	126	5	2	133	31
Captain	109	109	25
Lieutenant-colonel.	82	11	2	95	22
Colonel	38	12	4	54	13
First lieutenant ..	34	1	35	8
Second lieutenant.	3	3	1
Total.....	392	28	9	429	

Army Personnel at Schools Compared with Number of Students Enrolled in Units

Students	116,365
Enlisted men	900
Officers	392

Students per officer, 297; per enlisted man, 129.

Army Personnel Compared with Number of Schools

Enlisted men	900
Officers	392
Schools	260

Officers per school, 1.5; enlisted men, 3.5.

THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS

Provision is made for practical training of the members of the R. O. T. C. in summer camps in two periods of not to exceed six weeks each. The first camp is voluntary and takes place between the freshman and sophomore years. The second takes place between the junior and senior years, and is compulsory for those students enrolled in the advanced course of the R. O. T. C. The camps last year had an approximate enrollment of 4,000 students, while this year provision is being made for 10,000.

This year's camps will be conducted for a period of six weeks beginning June 17. Infantry R. O. T. C. camps will be located as follows:

- Camp Devens, Mass.—Attendance from the Eastern and Northeastern Departments.
- Camp Benning, Ga.—Attendance from the Southeastern Department and from Texas and Oklahoma.
- Camp Custer, Mich.—Attendance from the Central Department.
- Presidio of San Francisco.—Attendance from the Western Department and from Arizona and New Mexico.

Cavalry camps will be located at Fort Ethan Allen, attended by R. O. T. C. cavalry units from Culver, Ind., St. John's, Manlius, N. Y., and Norwich, Vt., and at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., from all other cavalry units.

Camps for R. O. T. C. units of other arms and services will be as follows:

- Field Artillery Camp Knox, Ky.
- Coast Artillery Fort Monroe, Va.
- Signal Corps Camp Alfred Vail, N. J.
- Engineers Camp Humphreys, Va.
- Motor Transport Corps..... Camp Holabird, Md.
- Ordnance Department Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.

The camps are generally located at training centers. Infantry units of the Southeastern Department will be particularly fortunate in coming under the influence of the Infantry School at Camp Benning. Cavalry units will receive the stimulation of training at established cavalry garrisons.

Courses of thorough military training have been provided for the camps, to be conducted by selected officers. Every effort will be made to make these camps profitable to the Government in the

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development of competent reserve officers and profitable to the students in the development of mental and physical attributes, especially confident and aggressive leadership.

The importance the War Department attaches to the Reserve Officers Training Corps is clearly indicated by the following extract from an address by the Secretary of War, at Lehigh University, in connection with the R. O. T. C. at that institution:

"American education in the past has been inclined to overlook the necessity of emphasizing that phase of its manifold activities which deals with the subject of preparation for national defense. A college education which has left untouched the fitting of its subject for active service under his country's flag is and must be incomplete. In the R. O. T. C. the college finds this vital addition to its curriculum, and the student who pursues the training which it offers finds the opportunity for physical and mental development which completes his equipment for the battles of life. Educational institutions have not been slow to recognize that with the establishment of the R. O. T. C. their own resources have been enriched. The great variety of the subjects taught in this work, the enthusiasm of the students and instructors, and the close affiliation with the Central Government tend to indelibly impress upon the minds of students and college authorities alike the extent to which the modern army is in reality the nation in arms."

Editorial Comment

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL REAPPEARS

AFTER A SUSPENSION of publication for two years the CAVALRY JOURNAL, in new and revised form, again comes forth to take its place among the service magazines.

It is eminently appropriate that it should make its second literary bow in the spring; for, like the season that ushers in the rebirth of nature, its reappearance signifies the refulgence of the cavalry light which for five years has remained obscured by the fog of trenches, wire entanglements, dugouts, raids, hand grenades, trench mortars, and all of the other paraphernalia brought into the military game by the peculiar situation on the Western Front.

But, as we of the cavalry know, the prominence of the new weapons and of the other services only dimmed our light, and did not completely extinguish it, as many people, not too thoughtfully inclined, would have it appear.

It was not given to the cavalry to play a spectacular part in the war except at the beginning—a period so long ago that its events are already forgotten except by the historians. Hence we get little credit for the achievements of our arm in the early days, and therefore the CAVALRY JOURNAL has undertaken, as a part of its mission, to enlighten the non-believers.

Even a casual reading of this first issue will be sufficient to convince all doubting Thomases that cavalry was a factor in the war, and a study of the articles will stimulate the faith of the cavalry in itself.

Sir Douglas Haig's faith in his mounted troops never wavered, and their readiness for combat was always a matter of great consideration to him. Without them, his decisions must certainly have been different.

The French likewise hold their cavalry in high regard, realizing, with their unerring logic, the vital necessity of cavalry in a

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well-balanced army. They know, moreover, that had it not been for the cavalry, there never would have been a Battle of the Marne. What the Germans think may be gleaned from the able translation of General Dickman under "Topics of the Day."

American sober thought is in complete harmony on this subject with foreign ideas; but many officers, true to the American national characteristic of too ready adaptability, would change their apples for Dead Sea fruit by substituting the tanks and aëroplanes for the cavalry.

It will therefore be the aim of the JOURNAL to present the work of the cavalry in its true light; for as cavalry itself, our arm in the foreign armies, played a most distinguished rôle. It was not vouchsafed to American cavalry to give proof of its training, but the part played by individual cavalry officers is a record of which any arm might be proud.

Cavalry officers will appreciate that such a mission is not a one-man task, but calls for the support of the whole Cavalry Service.

The editorial policy contemplates keeping the JOURNAL at a standard of excellence second to none, and an appeal is here made to all cavalry officers to contribute to the columns. It is not necessary to write a treatise, in order to produce quality. The finest goods often come in the smallest packages.

As for the class of articles, all subjects of general interest, as well as topics technical to the cavalry arm, are desired.

It would not be fitting in this first issue to omit mention of the valuable services of the former editor, Colonel Ezra B. Fuller, cavalry, who for many years was Secretary and Treasurer of the Association and Editor of the JOURNAL.

Colonel Fuller gave his labors unstintedly to the upbuilding of the JOURNAL, and brought it to its enviable position when the war forced a suspension of publication. The thanks of the Cavalry Service are due Colonel Fuller for his devotion to the Association and for his achievements as an editor.

The CAVALRY JOURNAL was established in 1885, and therefore is older than the other service magazines put together. It has a flavor like old wine, and although good, it can be made better.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Undivided support, honest criticism, and suggestions are wanted and requested, all of which will be forthcoming if we do not lose faith in ourselves. Remember, "Faith reads a bracing gospel."

A CHIEF OF CAVALRY

HURRAH! A Chief of Cavalry at last! After all of the pleadings, the representations, the cajolings, and the exhortations of years, the cavalry is at last to come into its own and have a real Chief, who will supervise its needs, both present and prospective. It is gratifying to see the work of years about to be realized. Despite the fact that as cavalry we did not get into the war, the appointment of a Chief is a cause for thanksgiving and a restorer of morale. Both of the reorganization bills of the Senate and the House contain a proviso for the creation of this office, and, although it may be sometime before Congress is able to decide definitely upon the reorganization of the Army, it is safe to say that the Chief of Cavalry has come to stay and will be authorized. In the hearings before the Military Affairs Committees of the Senate and the House emphasis was laid upon the necessity of such an office, and no one could have heard the testimony of the able and experienced officers upon this subject without feeling impressed with their sincerity and conviction that it was for the best interests of the service. The members of the committees, who are remarkably well informed of the Army's needs, are unanimous in the belief that the cavalry as well as the infantry can only attain their maximum efficiency under the direction of a leader who supervises carefully its training, instruction, and equipment. Neither the cavalry nor the infantry have ever had their needs properly represented at the War Department.

If there was anything required to convince Congress of the desirability of this important and constructive piece of legislation, the testimony of General Pershing before the joint committee of the Senate and House was sufficient. Speaking from his ripe experience and with his indisputable prestige, he said:

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"The appointment of a Chief of Coast Artillery has proved very beneficial to that arm. It provides a competent head to supervise instruction, equipment and training, and I think this same provision should be extended to the field artillery, infantry, and cavalry, under the designation of Inspector of Field Artillery, Inspector of Cavalry, and Inspector of Infantry. These men should become advisers to the Chief of Staff and the General Staff in all that pertains to their particular arms."

It is astonishing that it has taken so long to secure this office, and the great pity is that it did not exist prior to the war, so that there could have been collected all data with reference to our arm, in order that we might draw therefrom the conclusions that we should have today regarding proper organization and correct armament and tactics. As General Eltinge ably points out in his article in this number, the lack of a chief has been a great handicap to our development; but we must not look to the past, but to the future, and lay our plans to get the best results from the boon that will soon be conferred.

There is little or no talk at the Capital of prospective candidates, but it is to be hoped that the appointment will be made for recognized ability and fitness for the office. We must have a Chief of broad vision and sympathy, a capacious soul, able to understand—one who has the intendant gift, the ability to turn and look within, to seize, or rather sense, the viewpoint of his subordinates, down to that of the humblest private. Only such a Chief can really be successful. Otherwise he is apt to get the viewpoint of the bureaucrat. What is admirably appropriate from the vantage-point of Washington is oftentimes singularly inappropriate along the border. Our service is peculiarly arduous, more so than that of the other branches in this country, so that its needs cannot be standardized, so to speak, but must receive the care and attention that we ordinarily give to individual questions. But, whoever he may be, he can rest assured that he will have the support of the cavalry, wholeheartedly and unreservedly. Never before has a candidate taken office attended by a greater amount of good will and sympathy in his task.

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THE ROTATION OF CAVALRY ON THE BORDER

IT SEEMS REMARKABLE, upon reflection, that although the cavalry has for years been doing border duty, no definite policy governs the length of this disagreeable service for the regiments. Officers and men have experienced considerable discomfort in being obliged to live on indefinitely in border camps, where it is impossible for them to have their families with them, or, if this privilege is possible, then to provide any educational facilities for their children. A regiment which is ordered to the border goes there with an indefinite sentence hanging over its head and with no hope held out that after a period of arduous service relief will come. The state of affairs is unintelligent and destructive of efficiency, but it comes from the fact that the cavalry is without a chief, and that no one in particular is charged with the important duty of watching these regiments and studying their needs. It is the old story of "What is everybody's business is nobody's business."

The same uncertain state of affairs is similarly true for the cavalry regiments that are fortunate enough to be in the posts. No one has any intimation of how long he will be there, with the result that an officer is unable to make any plans for the future, either for himself or his family.

It is not known whether any definite plan for the rotation of cavalry regiments has been followed in the past, but at any rate the impression is pretty general that there has been no plan. The only thing to do, therefore, is to eradicate that impression by publishing a policy of rotation between the border and the posts and faithfully living up to it. It should be announced in orders devoid of all ambiguous, vague, and meaningless expressions, such as "It is hoped that the situation will soon permit the return of the regiment to its station." When a regiment is ordered to the border, the order should announce a definite period of service, as, for example, two years, as formerly in the case of tropical service.

The order should name each of the regiments and state that the rotation is to take place on *definitely announced dates*. It may be, of course, that some unforeseen circumstance will inter-

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fere with the program; but if it is really a military necessity, the officers and men will accept it philosophically and suffer no more from disappointment, or as much, as they do from the present uncertainty.

It so happens that half of our regiments are occupying posts and half of them camps, so that the mechanics of arranging a transfer of regiments would offer no great obstacle. We have the following posts: Riley, Ethan Allen, Bliss, Oglethorpe, Huachuca, Sam Houston, Russell, and Monterey, where some degree of comfort may be had; and then the camps: Douglas, Ringgold, Bliss, Marfa, Columbus, Clark, Brownsville, and Southern California. It would seem feasible, from this distribution of our regiments, to announce that on, say, June 1 the First Cavalry will exchange stations with the Second; on July 1 the Third Cavalry will exchange stations with the Fourth, and so on. Let me hasten to remove the shivers of horror that the Second and Third Cavalry will feel by saying that these numbers are used only to illustrate the thought, as the justice of these exchanges has not been investigated. By such an announcement, made months in advance, every officer will know approximately where he stands and will not be mentally harassed with the thought that out of a clear sky some day he will awake to find his life disorganized once again.

This is a subject that merits the most careful and intelligent study on the part of the War Department, if we are to preserve the loyal spirit of our officers. Times have changed, and it is no longer fashionable to give orders arbitrarily, vouchsafing to oneself all of the omniscience in the world.

We have been told for years to be patient about the border service, and to accept it philosophically, as an exigency of the service; but let us remind the counselors "that there was never yet a philosopher who could endure the toothache patiently."

WEST POINT

DUTY—HONOR—COUNTRY

The words of General Pershing, in his hearings before the joint committees of Congress relative to West Point, are so full of good sense and wisdom that they should be of great weight with

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the lawmakers at this time, when many ill-informed people are advocating drastic changes in our National Military Academy. To quote from the hearings:

"I should regret to see any steps taken that would impair the efficiency of West Point. This institution has furnished the Army for more than a hundred years with officers upon whom has fallen the training of our armies and the maintenance of our military traditions. While it does not necessarily follow that a graduate of West Point is, *per se*, better equipped than officers who have received education at other institutions, yet there is in that training such a solid foundation of character, discipline, and patriotism, in addition to the education and purely military features, that it should be given every encouragement. We should continue to give it every encouragement, as we have in the past."

Whatever else may be said against the Academy, it cannot be denied that West Point has always been one of the most efficient institutions of this country. It was never intended by its founder, George Washington, that it should be a three months' training camp, but that it should be an Academy for the training of officers. Yet every effort was made during the war to change this fundamental idea of the Academy and turn it into a training camp in order to swell the grand total of one hundred thousand emergency officers by the addition of a few hundred youths barely twenty years old! It was done, so it was said, that in order West Point might not be lagging behind the other universities of the country which had, to reverse the metaphor, turned their plowshares into swords and the beehives into helmets. There were some who wished the parade ground dug into trenches and barbed wire stretched around the reservation, who raved that the idea of a cadet in the English course reading the poems of Amy Lowell was absolutely incompatible with the fact that the United States was at war, and because a few of the conservatives held tenaciously to the century-old idea that the cadet must first be educated before he is fit to be an officer they were accused of being old fogies and with one grand mental sweep relegated to keep company with the ghosts of a past age. It was overlooked that for a century West Point had been doing thoroughly what the training camps were attempting to do hastily during the war, and that the Academy had been turning out a product that had been tested as well as human standards can test a man.

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But the hysteria of the country had to be satisfied and cadets were graduated after a half-digested course. The close of the war brought forth added clamor for changes in this great institution. Every officer or man with a grievance against the Army got very excited about the West Point methods, and as a taxpayer claimed the right to decide its future destiny. Even so well-informed a man as Frederick Palmer came out in Collier's Weekly with a misleading article on "What is the Matter With West Point?" But we should not be led astray by the ignorant talk of the uninitiated and imagine that a radical change is necessary in our National Academy. On the contrary, we would be lacking in our duty to the nation did we not stand up courageously for the principles for which this Academy has always stood and make only those changes which the war has demonstrated as wise.

Nearly all graduates deplored the change in the course from four to three years, but happily a reversal to the four-year course will occur if the proviso to this effect in the Military Academy appropriation bill becomes law.

It is noted with great satisfaction that hereafter the summer training of the cadets will be given at one of the large camps of the country, where there is more room and where the Corps will be able to live under the same conditions as do the soldiers of the Army. The summer camp at the Academy was all very well when the Corps was small and before the Army developed and broadened, but today it is inadequate and besides it is rather a camp *de luxe*.

It would be more desirable if the cadet could serve in the ranks of the Army before receiving his commission, for then he would actually obtain the enlisted man's viewpoint by hard experience and his familiarity with the life of his men would ripen his judgment at an earlier period in his career than now occurs.

Such an experience, coupled with more frequent contact with the world while a cadet, would soften the rigidity of his viewpoint. As it is now the cadet lives a life of monastic seclusion, and it is this very seclusion which in the past has had a tendency to make the graduate alien in thought to the average American. And his entry into the service did not help matters any for the

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system kept him usually from as frequent contact with the people in general as is desirable.

Yet in the liberalizing of the cadet's education there is one thing which it is hoped will not be destroyed or impaired. I refer to the beauty of his discipline and his unquestioning response to the orders of his superiors. He has an elevated sense of duty developed through constant insistence upon attention to the small things of life, on the theory that "what is good and venerable to hear when a child forever retains its authority over the mind."

This sort of discipline and obedience are essential to any Army which hopes for success, even though it may not be exactly in harmony with the modern Soviet spirit, which recognizes precious little discipline and certainly no superiors. At present the cadet is carefully guarded from this malign influence and perhaps too much so; therefore it is best that he be less of a monk and more of a man of the world.

The changes so far made are in the right direction; but when making changes in an institution which has successfully fulfilled its mission for one hundred and eighteen years, conservatism should be the policy.

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The profits made from the Book Department are used to help defray the running expenses of the Association and for the publication of the JOURNAL. The subscription price by no means pays for the latter in view of the enormously increased cost of printing. BEFORE BUYING BOOKS THINK FIRST OF THE CAVALRY ASSOCIATION, PLEASE!

Topics of the Day

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND THE CAVALRY

IN HIS OFFICIAL REPORT, "Features of the War," Sir Douglas Haig gives his opinion and views on the value of cavalry, describing the splendid rôle played by the mounted troops under his command during the war. But let the reader judge for himself the attitude of a great British general toward the cavalry after reading the following extract from the report:

"From time to time, as the war of position dragged on and the enemy's trench systems remained unbroken, while questions of man power and the shortage of shipping became acute, the wisdom or necessity of maintaining any large force of mounted men was freely discussed. In the light of the full experience of the war, the decision to preserve the cavalry corps has been completely justified. It has been proved that cavalry, whether used for shock effect under suitable conditions or as mobile infantry, have still an indispensable part to play in modern war. Moreover, it cannot safely be assumed that in all future wars the flanks of the opposing forces will rest on neutral States or impassable obstacles. Whenever such a condition does not obtain, opportunities for the use of cavalry must arise frequently.

"Throughout the great retirement in 1914 our cavalry covered the retirement and protected the flanks of our columns against the onrush of the enemy, and on frequent occasions prevented our infantry from being overrun by the enemy's cavalry. Later in the same year, at Ypres, their mobility multiplied their value as a reserve, enabling them rapidly to reinforce threatened positions of our line.

"During the critical period of position warfare, when the trial of strength between the opposing forces took place, the absence of room to maneuver made the importance of cavalry less apparent. Even under such conditions, however, valuable results may be expected from the employment of a strong force of cavalry when, after there has been severe fighting on one or more fronts, a surprise attack is made on another front. Such an occasion arose in the operations before Cambrai, at the close of 1917, when the cavalry were of greatest service, while throughout the whole period of trench fighting they constituted an important mobile reserve.

"At a later date, when circumstances found us operating once more in a comparatively open country, cavalry proved themselves of value in their true rôle. During the German offensive in March, 1918, the superior mobility of cavalry fully justified their existence. At the commencement of the battle, cavalry were used under the Fifth Army over wide fronts. So great, indeed, became the need for

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mounted men that certain units which had but recently been dismounted were hurriedly provided with horses and did splendid service. Frequently, when it was impossible to move forward other troops in time, our mounted troops were able to fill gaps in our line and restore the situation. The absence of hostile cavalry at this period was a marked feature of the battle. Had the German command had at their disposal even two or three well-trained cavalry divisions, a wedge might have been driven between the French and British armies. Their presence could not have failed to have added greatly to the difficulties of our task.

"In the actions already referred to east of Amiens, the cavalry were again able to demonstrate the great advantage which their power of rapid concentration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in close contact with both armored cars and infantry, they pushed ahead of the latter and by anticipating the arrival of German reserves assisted materially in our success. In the battle of October 8 they were responsible for saving the Cambrai-Le Cateau-St. Quentin Railway from complete destruction. Finally, during the culminating operations of the war, when the German armies were falling back in disorganized masses, a new situation arose which demanded the use of mounted troops. Then our cavalry, pressing hard upon the enemy's heels, hastened his retreat and threw him into worse confusion. At such a time the moral effect of cavalry is overwhelming and is in itself a sufficient reason for the retention of that arm.

"On the morning of the armistice two British cavalry divisions were on the march east of the Scheldt, and before the orders to stop reached them they had already gained a line ten miles in front of our infantry outposts. There is no doubt that, had the advance of the cavalry been allowed to continue, the enemy's disorganized retreat would have been turned into a rout."

A GERMAN VIEW OF CAVALRY IN THE WORLD WAR

THE CAVALRY ASSOCIATION is indebted to Major-General Joseph T. Dickman for the translation of recent German views on the cavalry of the future. In his letter dated at Coblenz, Germany, January 18, 1919, General Dickman wrote:

"It is, perhaps, not too early to do something to stimulate our cavalry. I therefore inclose a translation of an article that I ran across in a publication which for obvious reasons probably has not been circulating very freely in our country in the last few years. It is very interesting, as showing the trend of opinion in the German cavalry resulting from experiences in the Great War.

"You may know that I made some experiments with automatic rifles to be used by cavalry in the St. Mihiel campaign. I borrowed four Browning automatic rifles for experimental purposes and issued them to Colonel Hazzard, in command of a

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squadron of the 2d Cavalry. He carried them in the boot, just like any ordinary rifle, and used them effectively. I am convinced that the future armament of our cavalry must provide for a considerable number of automatic rifles and ammunition carried by the horses, or else on handy pack animals.

"I have not heard a word from any of the advocates of double rank and mass formations for cavalry, who tried to upset the American cavalry between 1911 and 1915. I guess the course of events has given them some food for reflection and they are content to keep quiet."

No officer of his generation has rendered more valuable service to the cavalry than General Dickman. At a period when there was a determined effort to abandon the valuable lessons of the Civil and Indian wars, and to reorganize the cavalry in a way to sacrifice its fire action, to a great extent, General Dickman remained steadfast. In 1913 the advocates of mass action had succeeded in securing the abolition of the pistol as a cavalry weapon. As the commander of the Second Division, then preparing for service in Mexico, I entered serious objections and the order was revoked. It is now probable that the pendulum may swing to the other extreme, through the abandonment of the saber, and thus permit all efforts to be concentrated upon training cavalymen to a more perfect use of automatic pistols, in connection with the magazine rifles.

The time is ripe for full and free discussion of the future of the American cavalry. What other nations are discussing in connection with cavalry service is at all times of interest. With the recent World War fresh in mind, there are an infinite number of experiences worthy of recital and discussion. We need only to guard against drawing general conclusions based on exceptional and isolated examples. It is entirely probable that German opinion has been much influenced by the magnificent service rendered by General Allenby's cavalry in the 1914 campaign, before the armies had settled down to a state of siege and trench warfare.

WILLIAM H. CARTER,
Major-General.

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(Translated from "*Militär-Wochenblatt*" No. 77, Berlin, December 25, 1918)

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY, January 13, 1919.

A WORD TO THE CAVALRY

(By Captain LUDWIG DREES)

In "*Militär-Wochenblatt*" No. 60, the old master, Plinzner, after a prolonged silence, again appears in public with a rather long article, in which he recommends another practical execution of his old method of the complete collection of the forehand by a body of troops especially organized for this purpose.

As is only to be expected from so esteemed a personage as the author, the article has undoubtedly been read with widespread interest and has afforded abundant food for reflection.

Especially interesting is the fact that in paragraph 3 a cavalryman of the old school openly admits that the time for the attack by cavalry in mass has definitely passed, and that consequently the principal function of the horse no longer is to carry the rider in battle, but rather to the battlefield, and that the selection and training of the horses must be effected with these considerations in view.

It is a source of much satisfaction that this opinion has gradually made its way, although with bleeding hearts on the part of many supporters of the old cavalry battle. But the other arms of the service have had the same experience as the cavalry; the long war, with its many technical discoveries, has demonstrated clearly to all of us that everywhere the progress of technical science has greatly reduced the poetry of existence.

We are, however, permitted to assert quite positively that all the other arms adapted themselves to this fact before the war and made deductions therefrom to a much greater extent than the cavalry. Time and again the rules and regulations of the cavalry demanded the primary solution of all problems from the saddle with the *arme blanche*, and although considerable space was devoted to dismounted action, it was only done begrudgingly, which was wrong. In the modern high state of development, the firearm is in every form the only decisive weapon. In comparison, the importance of fireless weapons—and this cannot be emphasized too often—sinks to a minimum, even in the cavalry. It would be "carrying coals to New Castle" to attempt to elucidate such a commonplace fact to participants in the four years' war. I think we have all had ample personal opportunity to gather experience on this subject.

As with so many other things, it is a question of clearing the decks thoroughly and of building up anew on principles recognizing only the most modern conditions.

In this matter, Pastmaster Plinzner has taken a step in advance, and the army is indebted to him for it. It is also desirable that his training method be subjected to an exhaustive test.

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A well-known general once made the following remark about a new army unit which was developing with remarkable rapidity: "Yes, they are not burdened with traditions." In this expression there is much profound truth. Now that we, if under painful circumstances, are in a similar situation, we should seek to discover and utilize the good that may be concealed therein.

If, however, there is an arm of the service that has a prospect of securing for itself a position for the future, it certainly is the cavalry. This position offers, in addition to its great importance on the field of battle, a specially interesting and diversified service. But the cavalry itself must not look backward, but take into account only the new conditions, and, without splitting up its strength and opinions, march in closed ranks towards reconstruction.

I do not hesitate to make the statement that a large part of the cavalry had not accepted the fundamental notion of the supremacy of the firearm and refused to adopt it. In this they were encouraged by higher authority, which in every direction supported the *arme blanche*. Many had at bottom probably quite modern views on this subject, but the existing current of opinion was too strong for them. It is of no use to argue that in the cavalry there were also supporters of dismounted action; for example, General Von Bernhardt, who not only in a practical way, but also in his talks and writings, insisted upon dismounted action. It is fortunate that such leaders were in existence, so as to furnish at least some resistance to the prevailing current. However, they could not make a lasting impression, for the false idea was too deeply rooted, that extensive adoption by the cavalry of dismounted fire action would injure the cavalry spirit. Every individual rider was instructed with that idea in view, and it was thoroughly drilled into him, and the regulations prescribed that he was to ride at anything and in that way solve his problems. How soon did our cavalry have to learn anew, at the expense of severe losses, that they should not ride into villages, woods, etc., to reconnoiter them, but would have to dismount and with rifle and grenades in their hands attack them as infantry? Exceptions will, of course, often occur, but they will only prove the rule.

In short, it may be said that it will be the principal duty of the cavalry, after a quick dash to a threatened point, to hold a position against superior numbers and to fight until the slower infantry can arrive to furnish support and relief.

It goes without saying that the inferiority in numbers must, as far as practicable, be counterbalanced by skill with the rifle, and that, if possible, every rider and every rifle must be actively employed in the combat. This requires a type of organization and equipment which, in dismounting to fight on foot, whether with or without movable horses, permits the reduction of horse-holders to a minimum. If this principle is to be carried out, the clumsy lance, which in nearly every situation is a great inconvenience, must disappear. The disadvantages, which especially in dismounted action are apparent, are so great that we shall not go far wrong in

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the assertion that its retention is in great measure to blame for the aversion which cavalry soldiers have for dismounted action, especially in time of peace.

In campaign I have addressed a large number of cavalry soldiers and asked the question, whether they had ever brought an enemy down with their lance; the answer was always in the negative. I believe it is not saying too much when I state that in this war the lances were carried mostly for show, and not always with pleasure for the horse and the rider. On the other hand, we have had the experience that squadrons which had been a long time in the East, and gotten rid of their lances in their cavalry service, when they came back to us in the West were quickly re-equipped with lances and received positive orders to ride with the lance, even in difficult country. The object of these orders was not understood by the cavalry, nor by the other troops, and probably was due to an effort to carry out the regulations, and perhaps also to the fact that a visit was expected at the front from higher authority.

The lance must disappear, for only in that way can the cavalry arrive at thorough instruction with the carbine and place complete reliance thereon. Intimately connected with this question is the selection of man and horse. If no further cavalry battles are to be fought, then we no longer need battle cavalry—that is, heavy shock troops. We shall require only a uniform type of troops, and these must be as mobile as possible—that is, with small horses and light riders, who are active and skillful in quick mounting and dismounting in every possible combat situation. Recently there appeared in the "Artillery Monthly Review" an article on the question "Horse Breeding After the War." I paid special attention to this question and insisted that in later peace times the artillery should receive the benefit of the horse-supply, on which it has a good claim and which heretofore has disappeared in the cuirassier stables. Cavalry with modern ideas will not shed tears over the loss of these animals, for they are quite unsuitable for the cavalry service of the present day, as are also the heavily booted and raw-boned cuirassiers themselves.

It might be carrying the matter too far to enter into further elucidation of facts which are so evident; yet I would call to mind the difficulties of feeding, sheltering, and keeping these large animals, their lack of endurance at rapid gaits, and their deficient adaptability in difficult country.

With the fall of the lance admitted, the saber* must come into its own again, for the rider must have a handy weapon for the *mêlée* and the pursuit.

I am of the firm conviction that the saber, which when not in use burdens neither man nor horse, is amply sufficient. Proof of this should be found in the fact that the cavalry of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, at their most flourishing period of cavalry battles, fought their combats for the most part with the saber. Frederick the Great and Napoleon would certainly have armed their cavalry with the lance if they had considered it the correct thing to do. What was then unneces-

* Carried on the horse, this small side-arm must, of course, during the fighting on foot, remain attached to the pommel.

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sary, according to the judgment of these two great soldiers, should certainly not find a place today, when firearms have been developed to such a remarkable extent.

Reduction in the period of service makes the disappearance of the lance welcome, for the training of the soldier without a lance is considerably simplified, and its disappearance also is of benefit to the legs of the horses, which can be ridden to a much greater extent in the open country and with both hands.

All in all, I see only advantages in the abandonment of the lance. I am quite sure that if the cavalry, to include the last private, is firmly convinced that the horse is for riding and the carbine for fighting, then the cavalry itself will make the largest contribution to the destruction of the view which has gradually developed in lay circles, namely, that cavalry is superfluous and has outlived its usefulness. The origin of this false conception is largely due to the cavalry itself, because of its inopportune attacks with the *arme blanche*. The cavalry can really not render itself a better service than by unreserved acknowledgment of its dependence on firearms.

COMMENTS

The author of this article does not seem to be aware of the fact that cavalry of the type now advocated by him has been in existence in America for more than half a century; also, he says nothing about the automatic pistol as a weapon for mounted troops.

It is safe to predict that European cavalry will be reorganized, and that the change will be in the direction of increased mobility and greater fire power. In our own Army the labor of various boards during the last seven years, resulting in two sets of drill regulations, may as well go into the discard. A fresh start should be made, and in the revision the mobility and carrying power of cavalry should be utilized in the rapid transfer of automatic rifles and ammunition to the scene of action.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Maj.-Gen'l.

COBLENZ, GERMANY, 18 Jan., '19.

STOEKS MORTARS AS A CAVALRY WEAPON

THE USE OF STOKES MORTARS as a part of cavalry equipment should not be overlooked in determining the proper weapons for the cavalry in modern combat. Our cavalry problem on the

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southern frontier and the conditions that we must face need special consideration, independent of mere theory. In France the Stokes mortar was an efficacious weapon, especially against machine-gun nests; but often in the advance, as at Soissons, inadequate and improper transportation facilities prevented its maximum use. It is generally regarded as an infantry weapon, but there is a place for it in certain kinds of cavalry employment.

Writing in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India, Lieutenant-Colonel B. Abbay, 27th Light Cavalry, has the following to say of the Stokes mortar. His interesting conclusions afford food for thought and consideration:

"No one who has not pursued raiders all day over the burning sands and beneath the brazen skies of the frontier, with a temperature of 120° in the shade and a water-bottle of tepid chlorinated Epsom salts, can imagine the chagrin when, after surrounding the enemy in some stronghold towards evening, it is found that the guns are so far behind that they cannot come up in time to finish off the 'show' at once, and a line has to be drawn round the enemy's stronghold which is as capable of holding them, once darkness falls, as a sieve is of holding water, and the knowledge is forced home that at dawn the enemy will be many miles away.

"The reissue of the withdrawn bayonets to cavalry on the frontier has opened again the possibility of pressing home a dismounted attack, but only with heavy loss of valuable lives—a course every soldier will adopt reluctantly when the quarry is vermin.

"Even the arrival of the guns may be of little avail, if the trajectory is too flat to enable them to hit the lair of the tribesmen, and some device must be thought of to bolt the pursued.

"Now the advantages of arming cavalry regiments on the frontier with a Stokes mortar are as follows:

"(a) Stokes mortars are easily carried on a pack-horse; 12 shells go to a load. The section is as mobile as a Hotchkiss gun.

"(b) Cavalrymen can be turned into Stokes gunners in a month.

"(c) Stokes mortars can be used for high-angle fire, and to hit a target in a nalla or in dead ground that a gun could not reach.

"(d) They can also be used as a gun for direct fire. It has frequently been stated that Stokes mortars are of no use on the frontier, because they will not blow down towers. The people who make this statement forget that every tower has a door, and that every tower has a roof, and that the Stokes mortar is so accurate a weapon that shells can be dropped onto a roof or fired into a doorway with certainty, if a team is fighting that has specialized in the handling of the Stokes mortar.

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"Now a 10.2-pound shell dropped on a roof and exploding there has a very different effect to one bursting on the side of a mud tower; also, a shell bursting in a doorway is very effective. I will give some examples.

"A village was subjected to trench-mortar fire. It was found that where the shells fell on a roof, they either went through it and burst, wounding everything in the room below, or they blew a hole in the roof.

"Nine raiders were surrounded in a village. As the result of a Stokes mortar, they fled to the masjid. A shell fell on the masjid roof, went through, killed two and wounded six. The effect was excellent, as their rifles were at once thrown out into the street and they surrendered.

"To sum up:

"Stokes mortars can keep up with cavalry.

"They are effective if used against frontier buildings, nallas, etc.

"The personnel can be easily trained.

"The following is suggested as a detachment:

"N. C. Q.'s, 1 }
"Sowars, 4 } for one mortar.

"Transport: (a) With squadron—Gun and bipod on one horse.
24 shells on two horses.

(b) With 1st line—36 shells on three mules. Transport.

"A squadron recently got into difficulties in very bad country; a Stokes mortar came into action and fired 8 shells, on which the enemy (Mahsuds) fled hastily."

THE MILITARY ENGINEER

THE SERVICE is to be congratulated upon the revised appearance of the service magazine of the Corps of Engineers. The title has been changed from "Professional Memoirs" to "The Military Engineer," and the nature and scope of the periodical have undergone a metamorphosis.

The first issue under the new era is in general appearance a book of artistic balance, the result of excellent typography, clear illustrations, and high-grade presswork.

The articles, as might be taken for granted, are of the same high order as everything done by our Engineer Corps. They are professionally interesting and discuss the engineering problems and methods, both civil and military, that are engaging the thought of engineers of today.

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FEDERAL AID TO SOLDIERS

MANY REPORTS have been spread broadcast that men who are entitled to free treatment by the Government are spending their own money and not getting the attention that they should have. The reason seems to be an unfamiliarity with their rights under the law. The public Health Service has been designated to care for all such cases, providing medical, surgical, hospital, and sanatorium care. If any of our readers know of any discharged soldiers, sailors, marines, or war nurses suffering from some injury or ailment which dates back to service in the Army, encourage him to take his troubles to the Government.

The Public Health Service maintains a chain of hospitals, combining with them recreation, vocational training, and wholesome entertainment.

A large number of soldiers are not yet aware that the Government offers them free treatment. Please tell them to write to the United States Public Health Service, Washington, D. C.

Regimental Notes

THIRD CAVALRY—Fort Myer, Va.

Notwithstanding the bitterly cold weather, the officers and men of the 3d Cavalry have not relaxed their efforts to maintain their efficiency at the very highest standard. The morale of the personnel is in excellent condition and the entire command on its toes, so to speak, due to the able leadership of General Lloyd L. Brett, our regimental commander, who was retired from active service after a distinguished career as an officer.

Among the various activities at Myer, the weekly equestrian exhibitions stand out very conspicuously. Visitors, who are familiar with the horse and his possibilities, having remarked time and again that a marvelous success has been obtained with the raw mounts and men—the drill instructors feel very much encouraged. The drills are given every Friday afternoon at 2 o'clock. Fortunate in the possession of a good gymnasium and a splendid riding arena, intensive work in preparation for these feats goes on from early morning to late evening, so that the program is varied with every performance. Although the snow and rain and severe cold have prevented the public of the Capital from coming in large numbers, the attendance has been all that could be expected, and at each entertainment special guests from the War Department and near-by posts have been noticed in the audience.

Nor has polo been neglected at this station, for, with the efforts of Major Browne, an atmosphere has been created and a training squad formed that will make this one of the finest of polo centers. It is stated that many officers of the War Department will soon organize a team that will test the prowess of this outfit. Besides the Artillery commander himself, prominent players who are conditioning themselves in the riding-hall and on the "wooden horse" are Lieutenant-Colonel Millikin, Major Swing, Captains Edw. Keyes, Diehl, Waters, Durant, Thayer, Wood, Williams, and Baylies; also Lieutenants Jadwin, Sibert, Creel, Hayman, Walsh, Greene, Daniels, Hanson, and Kernan.

To the delight of all interested in polo, it was lately announced in the Washington papers that Potomac Park is to be immediately rolled and thoroughly conditioned for games in the early spring. This is not a field of any mean quality, even when it is at its worst, so that enthusiasts are full of hope for the polo future.

Mounted service enlisted men were pleased some months ago with the announcement from the Education and Recreation Branch that polo mallets are to be issued to the regimental organization, and now they await with anxiety their arrival.

Spring is almost at hand and the diminutive mounts are impatient for a chance to break out into the open and onto the polo campus—to "get on the ball," so to speak. In the meantime devotees of polo are watching for press reports of the Grand

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Tournament of March 27 to April 15, which is to be under the patronage of Mr. Foxhall Keene, who ranks as one of the greatest players produced by America.

Finally, at the Spring Horse Show that is to be held at the south end of the Highway Bridge, the Fort Myer contingent will not be among the "also ran," for already, both among the officers and enlisted men, the deepest interest is evinced in running, jumping, and other events.

FOURTH CAVALRY

The 4th Cavalry boasts of having the champion football team of the Brownsville District, having succeeded in getting through the schedule without meeting a single defeat. For its great work it has been awarded a championship cup.

A great amount of enthusiasm has been aroused by the organization of a post of the American Legion at Ringgold. The post has been named in honor of Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund M. Leary, 4th Cavalry, who was killed by a fall in an aeroplane at this post on September 27, 1919.

The organization of a polo team for the enlisted men is in progress. The men are very much interested in the sport, and with the aid of the instructors it is anticipated that an excellent team will be produced. An excellent polo field, rated the best in this section of the Southern Department, has recently been completed and there is no reason why the polo played here should not be of the highest quality.

FIFTH CAVALRY

The 5th Cavalry is covering the entire Big Bend District, a distance of 420 miles of boundary line between the United States and Mexico. Headquarters of the regiment, and Troops G, K, L, M, Headquarters and Supply, are stationed at Camp U. S. Troops, Marfa, Texas; Troop A, Candelaria; Troop B, Hollands Ranch, Valentine; Troop C, Indio; Troop D, Glenn Springs; Troop E, Polvo (Redford P. O.); Troop F, Ruidosa; Troop H, Lajitas; Troop I, Hesters Ranch, Sierra Blanca.

Daily patrols are being made by all troops at river stations, in addition to regular camp duties.

A number of organizations of this command are organizing or have organized troop polo teams from the commissioned and enlisted personnel.

SIXTH CAVALRY

During the past three months the 6th Cavalry has been stationed at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga. For a part of this time the guard duty was very arduous, as it was necessary to patrol the numerous and extensive National Army cantonments surrounding the post. About two months ago these cantonments were sold to a firm from Chicago, which is now tearing them down. Since the guard has been relieved, we are holding the regular troop and squadron drills. Six officers of the regiment, with parties of enlisted men, have been detailed on a recruiting campaign in the

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five adjacent States, and many compliments have been received on the appearance, conduct, and general activity of these parties. It has been necessary for the 6th Cavalry officers to take command of the Motor Transport Corps, stationed here, and the War Prison Barracks, where about a hundred and fifty alien enemies are still interned. Owing to the rainy weather and soft ground polo activity has been slight. There is an abundance of promising material for polo and it is hoped, when conditions are favorable, to turn out a good team.

EIGHTH CAVALRY

The commanding officer of the 8th Cavalry, Colonel George T. Langhorne, which has its headquarters at Fort Bliss, Texas, has recently been the recipient of two very complimentary letters concerning the conduct of his men while on duty at various places along the border.

In a letter from Gallup, New Mexico, the Community House secretary writes: "I wish to commend their courtesy to one and all while here. A finer bunch of men than the members of Troop 'K' would be hard to find," and the county clerk of the same town expresses his opinion of the members of the 8th Cavalry in the following terms: "It is indeed gratifying to know that we have such a splendid type of manhood in the United States military forces, and it cannot help but create a feeling of greater security to us civilians when we see such men as are the proud members of the 8th United States Cavalry. I want to assure you that the conduct, morale, and general appearance of the members of the 8th Cavalry while in Gallup was of the very best."

From 1915 to 1919 the 8th Cavalry has been engaged in protecting the border. During this service troops of the regiment have crossed into Mexico ten times and have had ten engagements with Mexican bandits who raided American territory, not to speak of the numerous small engagements of patrols. This service was marked by long, arduous marches, extreme heat and shortage of rations and forage. Approximately 400 miles of river front were protected by the regiment, which occupied thirteen stations. The last crossing of the troops in August, 1919, was to punish the captors of two Army aviators. On this expedition 285 miles of rough country were covered in five days without the loss of a single horse. The following extract from an official report made by an officer of the Morale Branch of the War Department shows the standing of the regiment:

"The appearance and general morale of the 8th Cavalry in this, the largest and most isolated of all border districts, is so remarkably good that special report is thereon made.

"I have never seen such a perfectly appointed command before in my service; the condition and appearance of horses, equipment, and men of the cavalry; of mules, harness, wagons, and carts of the trains and the pack train, was such as to make a profound impression. Every buckle and strap was cleaned and oiled and in place; the gaiting of the horses was remarkable. The entire command, with the

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exception of rolling kitchens, passed in review at the walk, trot, gallop, and extended gallop in nearly perfect formation.

"The regiment has been commanded for the last three years by Colonel George T. Langhorne, whose headquarters are in Fort Bliss, Texas."

TENTH CAVALRY

On July 26 and 27, 1919, the 10th Cavalry won the Arizona District Field and Track Meet, held at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, by the margin of 14 points. The 25th Infantry placed second, with 31 points, followed by the 19th Infantry, with 3 points. The 1st Cavalry scored 2 points. Ware, of the 10th Cavalry, won the 440-yard dash in the excellent time of 47 $\frac{4}{5}$ seconds, and in the 220-yard dash Williamson, of the 10th Cavalry, carried off first place in 21 $\frac{1}{5}$ seconds. Second and third place in this event went to 10th Cavalrymen. A large silver trophy was the team prize for this meet, and the usual gold, silver, and bronze medals went to the contestants who placed in the various events. Baseball and boxing concluded the events.

In August, 1919, the 10th Cavalry Polo Team challenged the 1st Cavalry for the Arizona District polo championship. Three games were played, all of which were won by the 10th Cavalry.

ELEVENTH CAVALRY—Presidio of Monterey, Cal.

Horse Shows.—In November officers and enlisted men of the regiment won 33 ribbons at the Horse Show, held in San Francisco by the California Live Stock Association.

Regimental Birthday.—On February 2 the regiment celebrated its 19th birthday by appropriate exercises, including an address by the regimental commander, a résumé of the history of the regiment, and the making of the day a holiday at all stations of the regiment.

Equitation.—Equitation at the Presidio of Monterey was started the latter part of October, held on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Fridays, Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Lee, 11th Cavalry, in charge. The officers having been in the service comparatively a short time, it was decided that the class would be more to teach officers to ride than school work in equitation. The school work embraced only enough to teach the proper aids and "hands" under all conditions.

The equitation class took part in a paper chase a few days ago, given at Del Monte Lodge. The run was about four miles and fairly stiff. The first rider to reach the hare was Captain John Pierce, Jr., 11th Cavalry, who was presented with a handsome silver cup.

Polo.—Polo has been started at the Presidio of Monterey, with Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Lee and Captain Charles L. Clifford in charge. There are about ten officers trying out ponies and practicing daily. Polo equipment has been requisitioned for, and we soon expect to practice and play games with the Del Monte Polo

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Team, who have fine polo fields about two miles from the post. A polo tournament between Del Monte, Santa Barbara, San Mateo, Coronado, the 7th U. S. Cavalry, and the British American Eastern Team is now in progress on these fields.

TWELFTH CAVALRY

Stations: Headquarters and auxiliary troops and the third squadron at Columbus, New Mexico; the second squadron at Hachita, New Mexico, and a border patrol of one troop at Culberson's Ranch. After a four years' tour at Columbus, the regiment has received orders to march overland to Del Rio, Texas, a distance of about 600 miles.

The great need of the regiment is men, and a recruiting party has been sent to Baltimore and Richmond to assist in the general recruiting drive and in the hope of filling the regiment.

One platoon of the regiment participated in the exhibition drill that was held at Fort Bliss in honor of the visit of General Pershing. The regiment will make use on the march of hay nets and thereby avoid feeding hay on the ground, a practice that has in the past resulted in great injury to our animals. These nets were used by mounted units of our Army in France and with excellent results.

THIRTEENTH CAVALRY

Station: Fort Clark, Texas. The regiment now stationed at Fort Clark has a personnel of 37 officers and 996 enlisted men, and with five recruiting parties of one officer and four enlisted men each canvassing the State of New York, it is hoped to have the regiment to authorized strength by April 1, 1920, although only about 50 recruits have been received to date.

Recent movement of troops: The 3d Squadron, in command of Major Roy B. Harper, ordered to McAlester, Okla., on December 3, 1919, for duty in the coal-mining district during threatened trouble; but fortunately the strike was settled and the squadron returned to proper station on December 23. While in McAlester several days were devoted to recruiting, and while no direct results were recorded it is considered that the time was not wasted.

On December 12 Troops "A" and "G" were ordered to Camp Del Rio, Texas, people in that locality hearing rumors that Mexican bandits were in the vicinity and intended making raids on the American side of the Rio Grande. These troops were kept on patrol duty at Del Rio until December 29, when they were returned to this post. Both of these movements were ordered at night, and the quickness with which they were executed was noted in a personal note from the Department Chief of Staff, addressed to the regimental commander, dated December 30, 1919.

In October, 1919, a sector of river patrol, consisting of two outposts at Pinto and Lehman's Ranch, were taken over from the 3d Infantry, troops alternating with

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intervals of one month. Troops "I," "F," "C," and "H" in turn with Troop "L," at present stationed at the outpost. All troops report having enjoyed their tour and are anxious for another tour of duty on the river.

SIXTEENTH CAVALRY

Stations: Headquarters at Brownsville, Texas, San Benito, Texas, and Mercedes, Texas. The quarter of the new year has been given over to target practice chiefly, the 1st and 3d squadrons conducting their practice in February and March and the 2d Squadron in March and April. This has offered the troops an opportunity for marching from the various stations to the range, the distance varying from 20 to 40 miles.

The 1st Squadron, at Camp Mercedes, Texas, has its outpost at the San Benito Pump, on the Rio Grande. Polo teams which have been organized at this station have done a great deal to arouse the interest of both officers and men, each group having teams in the field.

New Books Reviewed

THE LAST FOUR MONTHS. By Major General Sir F. Maurice, K. C. M. G., C. B.
Little, Brown & Co., Boston. \$2.50.

An excellent book for the purpose for which it is written, viz., as a résumé of the operations during the decisive period of the World War, the last four months. The author begins with a general outline of the operations and strategy from the beginning of the war down to the spring of 1918 and points out briefly the lessons learned and how these lessons affected the operations during the decisive period. Beginning with the German offensive of March 21, a more detailed account of all operations is given, the positions described, and the designation of divisions taking part stated.

The book is valuable for the reason that it sets forth the vast operations of the last four months briefly and shows how the various operations by different armies fitted in the victorious whole, thus furnishing the student of the war with a groundwork on which to base more detailed study.

The book is printed in large, clear type, easily read. The author treats of his subject in a manner which holds the interest, and, as General Maurice certainly had ample opportunity to obtain the facts, it should be an accurate history. The amount of space devoted to the part played by the American forces is quite flattering, coming from an English author.

VAUGHN COOPER.

THE CADENCE SYSTEM OF CLOSE ORDER. By Lieut. Colonel Bernard Lentz, General Staff (Infantry). Menasha, Wis.: George Banta Publishing Company, 1919. Paper, 124 pages, with numerous plates. Price, 50 cents.

The subject-matter of this volume was originally mimeographed for limited distribution by the War Plans Division of the General Staff and appeared in the *Infantry Journal* of December, 1918, under the title "The Minutiae of Close-Order Drill."

The pamphlet gives a system which is considered an amplification of the old "by-the-count" or "count-out-loud" method of drill, and impresses upon the reader the value of having the men in the ranks giving the commands in unison in order to keep their minds alert.

Minute explanations are given and an excellent outline for method and system in giving commands at drill.

In addition, there are plates showing the different positions of the feet while giving the different commands and counts in marching movements. The method, however, of chalking the blouse of a man who makes a mistake is not considered sound.

The success which Lieut. Colonel Lentz has attained as a close-order drill-master is well known.

The pamphlet contains an appendix giving all paragraphs in the Infantry Drill Regulations, 1911 (corrected July 31, 1918), pertaining to close-order drill.

The pages are not numbered up to page 14 and skip from page 40 to 57.

NEW BOOKS REVIEWED

Acknowledgment for the original idea is given to Lieut. Colonel H. J. Koehler, U. S. A., and for assistance to Captains F. A. Paul, G. S., and H. B. K. Wallis, Infantry.

The pamphlet contains an introduction by Brigadier General Charles King (Major, U. S. A., Retired).

E. E. LEWIS.

RECRUITER'S HANDBOOK. Compiled by Lieut. Colonel Wm. J. Connolly under direction of Colonel John P. Wade. Apply to the Adjutant General.

An excellent little book, which contains extracts from lectures by various officers and business men as to the most efficacious method of obtaining recruits. It draws an analogy between successful recruiting and the success that is accomplished through advertising properly and the correct methods of salesmanship. It also points out the necessity of the recruiting party getting in touch with all civic organizations and avoiding an isolated status in a community. The material in the pamphlet is good, but it is not attractively presented to the reader.

EDITOR.

THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR. By Roland G. Usher, Ph. D. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1919. Price, \$2.50.

A non-technical history of the World War, written by a civilian for civilians; intended to give a bird's-eye view of the war that may be easily understood. To a certain extent it does this, but the view is obscure and somewhat distorted.

A popular work, with all that the name implies, as note this quotation:

"This was the first great war fought with the new weapons which science had provided. The Russo-Japanese War, to be sure, tried them out somewhat, and the Boer War had shown some things, but in the main the result upon warfare of the new artillery and the new rifle was not fully appreciated, even by the Germans. One of the discoveries was shrapnel. This was a shell thrown from a short-range gun—and a gun firing no more than three miles was short range—timed to burst in the air and scatter over a wide area a great number of bullets or jagged fragments of iron. Flesh and blood could not resist it.

One of the great German surprises was the high-explosive shell loaded with one of the super-powders or super-dynamites. The explosion was so tremendous that one shell falling upon a regiment would annihilate it; landing upon a trench, it would simply wipe it out."

It may be noted in conclusion that while an entire chapter is given to Belleau Wood, no mention is made of the Meuse-Argonne. The reader of the book would believe, though not so specifically told, that the only action of the American Army as an army was St. Mihiel.

LE ROY ELTINGE.

"NOTES ON RIDING AND DRIVING." By Major R. S. Timmis, D. S. O.

This text covers, rather sketchily, practically everything connected with the horse world, from photography of horses to tandem driving. The valuable parts, as far as our service is concerned, are the chapters on "The Back," "The Saddle and Saddler," "Care of Harness and Saddlery," and "On Draught."

His instructions on care of leather, as is usual in most English publications, are very good and worthy of attention of any one, whether in the military service or

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not. His notes "On Draught" are good also, and it is to be regretted that he did not go deeper into this subject, which is about the only one connected with horsemanship that has not been very much overwritten.

The attempt has been made to cover practically the whole subject of horsemanship and care of equipment, with the result that no part is thoroughly covered.

Some of the principles of equitation which he advances are not borne out by the recognized authorities and are absolutely at variance with what is taught in our service.

STANLEY KOCH.

"THE ARMY BEHIND THE ARMY." By Major E. Alexander Powell. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.

To the reviewer the omission of a preface or foreword is a serious handicap, and Major Powell has omitted both in his book, "The Army Behind the Army." But whatever he may have intended to do when he set out to write this volume, he has succeeded in portraying both the romance and the achievement of the Bureaus, the Procurement Divisions, and the Supply Corps; of all activities behind the firing line that made possible the successful fighting of our combat divisions. It deals in stupendous figures of production; but the author's comparisons are so picturesque and his illustrations so striking that the reader easily visualizes the nation's tremendous task and the epoch-making achievement of the army behind the army.

It is a relief at this time to find any account of the World War that is not a criticism or a knock. This volume errs on the other side; in some places its praise is overdrawn. But it holds one's interest, is written in Major Powell's bright, pleasant, conversational style, and brings back the old savor of dugout tales and trench gossip. There are some statements in the book that the hard-boiled overseas fighter may not agree with, and in the next edition it is hoped that the author will make a few corrections; these add personal interest to an evening's reading, for it is a stupid book in which you cannot disagree with the author. The book is bright and untechnical, but for the service there are many interesting items and figures concerning supply that are unknown to the average officer. For the civilian there is a wealth of information and a record of accomplishment that will make him proud that he is an American.

JOSEPH A. BAER.